مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (٦) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر: امتيازات النفط في الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٥] (٤٠٢/٣٧٦)

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^he subject was considered in London at the end of June 1937, and
as a result His Majesty s Minister was informed that it was not proposed to
pursue the suggestion of a unilateral declaration by His Majesty’s Government
at least until the oil companies had decided to start prospecting and exploitation
in the disputed areas. The Foreign Office was, however, inclined to favour
R. Bullard s suggestion of a communication to Ibn Saud on the subject of a
survey of the disputed area, which might tahe the form of a rough topographical
enquiry into the geographical features of the area followed by the submission
of a report, though it was envisaged that it would be necessary to insist on the
inclusion of a representative of the Sheikh of Qatar in the survey party
Sir R. Bullard was authorised to speak to Ibn Saud or else to postpone the
question till later, when it might be possible to put forward more detailed
proposals. In virtue of these discretionary powers Sir R. Bullard, who was
about to depart for Riyadh when the telegram arrived, decided to leave the
matter until later, partly because all that he and, as it happened, the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf had had in mind was quite a short visit to the area
in question in order that the Saudi representative might, with the evidence of
his own eyes, see that the British contentions were correct and that the Jebel
Nakhsh did, in fact, form part of the Jebel Dukhan.
46. Meanwhile, the Government of Aden were asked by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies to consider whether some additional concession might not
be made in the area between parallels 17° and 18°, particularly to the west of
meridian 51°. The Secretary of State considered it desirable to examine the
question from the point of view of the limits of the area over which Aden tribes
had indubitable claims, rather than with the intention of excluding Ibn Saud
from those districts of which the ownership was completely indeterminate. The
Aden Government—although they expressed the hope that a smaller concession
would be made—considered that the utmost concession which could be considered
politically wise would be the cession to Saudi Arabia of an additional strip of
territory by redrawing the frontier from the intersection of the Violet line with
meridian 48° to a point on meridian 52°, 20 miles south of parallel 19°. This
proposal received the concurrence of the Colonial Office, but His Majesty’s
Minister was of the opinion that a strip of desert 20 miles wide by 300 long would
not possess much value as a counter in the game, since Ibn Saud apparently
attached no great importance to that part of the frontier at that moment.
Sir R. Bullard further believed that, in view of the opinion expressed by the
Governor of Aden, His Majesty’s Government should try to avoid making the
suggested sacrifice, although, if a unilateral declaration were to be made with
regard to the frontier of Qatar, he thought they should be prepared to leave to
Ibn Saud the whole of the strip in question. On the 1st July the Foreign Office
telegraphed to Jedda that the view of Flis Majesty s Government was that the
balance of advantage lay in leaving the question of the southern^ section in
abeyance for the present time. In conveying this decision to the Goveinor or
Aden, the Colonial Office pointed out that the present policy of establishing
British authority more firmly in the interior of the Protectorate wou d, .y
facilitating the acquisition of more detailed knowledge on the region strengtaen
His Majesty’s Government’s position for a subsequent statement of their claim
47. The Saudi Arabian-Muscat frontier, though it also was reviewed during
the year 1937, was not discussed in Jedda, but formed the subject of coiisioerable
correspondence between the Political Agent at Muscat and the Sultan The
Sultan showed himself reluctant to define the western limits of his y.
had never been done before. The possibility that tneie
concessions had—it was believed—made the i-U-tan even m ,P . . . a
would have been expected. However, in a letter f h d y® & yL^Jkn.dfno obittMn
on the 11th May, 1937, the Sultan fina ly stated that he ra . 1 p s ®
if the eastern limits of the territory belonging to Ibn Sa " d Vf • A by of the
based on the following points (see those selected for the definition of the
“ Riyadh ” line, paragraph 20) :
C. The intersection of 52
D. The intersection of 54
E. The intersection of 55° 40 E. and 22 N.
G. The intersection of 55° E. and 20 JN.
H. The intersection of 52
E. and 23° N.
40' E. and 22'
E. and 19° N.
40' N.
E. 3612/258/
91 (1937).
E. 3935/258/
91 (1937).
\
E. 3845/258/
91 (1937).