مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (٦) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر: امتيازات النفط في الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٦] (٤٠٢/٣٧٨)

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un me question mignt De denned as follows : -
E. 7656/258/
91 (1937).
(1) That until a final settlement was reached over the disputed area no oil '
company lepiesentatives from the Saudi side of the frontier would
enter the area, provided that a similar assurance was given by the oil
company which was operating in the Arab States on the Persian Gulf.
(2) That the Saudi Arabian Government had always been ready to conclude
an agreement, and that the obstacle had been the unwillingness of His
Majesty’s Government to recognise officially what territory was in
reality in the possession and under the influence of Ibn Saud; they
therefore enquired whether—
(3) His Majesty’s Government did not agree that it was preferable to define
the frontier in principle first ‘ c by specifying either places or
co-ordinates.”
52. In his report on the Saudi Arabian attitude, Sir P. Bullard stated that e. 7656/258/
Ibn Saud clung as tenaciously as ever to the Jebel Nakhsh and Khor-el-Odeid as 91 (1937).
well as to Safaq, actuated as he was by considerations of prestige, poverty and
the possibility of oil. He added that reports from the Persian Gulf Residency
on the Legation file showed that, in point of fact, it was Ibn Saud who
administered at least the first two of the places in dispute. Nevertheless, he was
well aware that the history of the case went very much further back than the
time of Ibn Saud, and that settlement on a purely tribal basis was out of the
question. He did, however, want to avoid forcing an issue to the question at a
time when European affairs loomed so large in international relations, and he
thought it would be worth while to await some amelioration of the international
situation before undertaking further oil prospecting in neutral areas.
53. Meanwhile, on the 22nd December, 1937, His Majesty’s Government
had decided that various proposals should be considered “ for securing the good
will of Ibn Saud ” in order to counteract, as far as possible, the inevitable ill
effects on the Arab world of His Majesty’s Government’s policy in Palestine. In
this connexion the suggestion was advanced that Ibn Saud might be given the
Jebel Nakhsh and an outlet on the Khor-el-Odeid, and that compensation should
be paid to the Arab rulers at whose expense these concessions would be made.
54. As a result of this decision and in an endeavour to meet the Saudi point
of view as stated in (1) of paragraph 51, it was decided to ascertain whether the
Petroleum Concessions, Limited, would, in fact, be willing to help His Majesty s
Government in this matter. Early in January 1938, a memorandum giving a E. 410^50/
historical survey of the position and an explanation of the motives whicn led His
Majesty’s Government to grant full approval to the Anglo-Iranian Oil - . y_ q
Company concession secured in May 1935 from the Sheikh of Qatar was com
municated privately and confidentially to Lord Cadman. It was explained that
at that time nothing was known of Ibn Saud s claims, and the possibility that he J
would ever seriously lay claim to territory as far east of the Blue line as the ,
Jebel Nakhsh seemed so remote as to be almost negligible. The concession was
therefore approved by His Majesty s Government without misgiving. Its terms
were never communicated to the Saudi Arabian Government, although they
protested against its conclusion at the time, and from later indications it j