مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (٦) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر: امتيازات النفط في الساحل المتصالح" [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎٦] (٤٠٢/٣٧٩)

16
i irnuression thcit it did not mclndG
appeared that they may have h P j arisen as the result of a
the Jebel Naktet-a mis^rs^d^ charg6 d’Affaires at
letter addressed to Sheikh ^ui . ^ «, th concession does not extend to
Jedda in September 1935, which stated that ^ - (se e paragraphs 18
any territory under discussion with the Saudi ^ ^ ^ the ^ ,
above and 59 below). It was . P £ t | e f ron tier question with Ibn Saud
desirability of reaching a final settlement cd Me tro™ ^ t0 consider the
had of late become so ’mrconcession in regard to the
possibility of effecting a sote ion > d b no means certain that an offer
Khor-ebOdeid or the Jebel Nakhste It seen ^ Saud to aC c ep t His
Ittty^Gotnt^ frontier, but there
Majesty s uoieimi-ei H t j b j Nak lsb mlg ht well reconcile him
It was, therefore,“suggested that if the
Petroleum Concessions, Limited, were willing to conclude an arrangement with
the CalXrnian Arabian Standard Oil Company whereby both companies would
agree to exploit the Jebel Nakhsh area jointly and to share any profits that might
b? derived therefrom, the chief obstacle to an agreement with Ibn Saud would be
overcome and the possibility of reaching a final solution of the frontier question
would be considerably nearer. ■ . , , , , A
55. Lord Cadman made it clear m his reply that be was strongly opposed
to any concession on this point and, as a result, it was decided to abandon the
question of any cession in the Jebel Nakhsh, and to concentrate attention on the
possibility of making some concession over the Khor-el-Odeid.
56. As a result of this decision consideration of the question of some cession
in the Khor-el-Odeid to Ibn Saud was renewed. According to views expressed
on behalf of the Service Departments at this time, there was no objection on
grounds of strategy to the cession of the Khor-el-Odeid to Ibn Sand, or substance
in the view that it was strategically important to have an unbroken line of British-
controlled States along the Persian Gulf. Finally, it was decided early in 1938
to ascertain the views of His Majesty’s Minister at Jedda, the Government
of India, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the proposal to
cede the area adjoining the Khor-el-Odeid.
57. Meanwhile, the controversy in its local aspect, which was already acute
enough at the end of 1937, was further envenomed in 1938 as the result of two
unfortunate incidents : an indiscretion on the part of the Jedda representative
of the Californian Arabian Standard Oil Company, as a consequence of which
Ibn Sand learned that His Majesty’s Government had been in direct communica
tion with the company about the frontier question; and the discovery that
Ibn Saud had misread, or at any rate misinterpreted, the letter sent to
Fuad Bey Hamza by Mr. Calvert in September 1935 (see paragraph 18).
58. As stated in paragraph 50, the Jedda representative of the Californian
Arabian Standard Oil Company, Mr. Lenahan, had been informed of the
proposal to appoint a joint Anglo-Saudi frontier commission by His Majesty’s
Minister, and warned of the line beyond which His Majesty’s Government
considered no company ho] ding a Saudi concession had a right to go In a
subsequent conversation with Fuad Bey, Mr. Lenahan most indiscreetly alluded
i l- mforma , Tlon ’ whereupon the Saudi Arabian Government on the
LnosnurTt'" 7 nu " t a P, Iotesl y Majesty's Legation against communications
rXL7o7r Hy 5 .Majesty s Minister or the Foreign Office and local repre-
thev nointpH ont^ 3 •* P™, 1 ® 11 . ^yabum Standard Oil Company in a manner which,
they pointed out, might be interpreted as implying the existence of doubts and
suspicions about the attitude of Ibn Saud. The oil companies their note added
acted in accordance with instructions which were issued’ to them he The
SThFf“L7tW°terr h t territ0ri fl in , which they worked, andS questbn
a.nd not°^ f ™" ld ^ k 0 ™—
informing Sir R Bullard that the communication to M? T en,? t, n °A y
as a personal affront by Ibn Saud as imnlATA Tr h ? d been tak, l n
something underhand which it rea'uired nrfJ that he y ight endeavour to do
Fuad Bey, during a conversation withffis Maj^ty^Mi^ter^reto^toTe