"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [و‎‎٣‎٢] (٥٦٦/٦٨)

ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION, 1907
35
of a clear understanding with Russia would prevent matters
getting worse. Moreover, an agreement with her was the
natural complement of our entente with France, who was
Russia's ally. On the other hand, Russian despotism was so
repugnant to British ideals that, had it not been for the recent
institution of the Duma in Russia, H.M. Government would
have found it difficult to justify the Convention to the British
public.
By the terms of the Convention both countries agreed to re
spect Persian integrity and independence and stated their desire
for the preservation of order in Persia and its pacific develop
ment, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advant
ages for the commerce and industry of other nations. Having
geographical and economic reasons for the maintenance of
peace and order in the Persian provinces conterminous with
their respective frontiers and being desirous of avoiding all
motives for conflict between their respective interests in
these regions, they agreed on the following arrangement.
Great Britain would not seek for herself, for her own subjects,
or for the subjects of a third power, any political or commercial
concessions north of a line running from Qasr-i-Shirin and
including Isfahan, Yezd and Kakh to the point on the Persian
boundary where the Russian and Afghan frontiers intersected.
Russia similarly bound herself in regard to the area south of
a line running from Bandar Abbas and including Kerman
and Birjand to Gazik on the Afghan frontier* Both nations
also agreed not to oppose, without previous discussion, any
concession which the subjects of the other Power might seek
in the neutral zone between these lines.
Owing to the alarm caused in Persia by the news of this
convention, the British Minister at Tehran found it expedient
to send at once to the Persian Foreign Minister a reassuring
memorandum. This repudiated in the most explicit manner
any aggressive designs or desire to interfere in Persian affairs
and it guaranteed the independence and integrity of Persia.
It concluded by declaring that not only did Great Britain and
Russia not seek a pretext for intervention, but that their
* This line was a compromise between the views of the Government of
India, who urged that it should include the Lower Karun Valley and the head
of the Persian Gulf, and those of Lord Kitchener (then Commander-in-Chief
in India) who considered that we should limit our responsibilities to the
semi-desert areas of Persian Baluchistan, Kain, Seistan and Kerman and
that it would be a strategical advantage to us if Russia and Germany were
to establish ports in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea where we could
attack them. The Germans, it may be noted, were still continuing their
efforts to gain a footing on the shores of the Gulf.