"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٣] (٥٦٦/٢٣١)

192
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
Nushki
railway
extension.
and maintain the numbers which the situation required. This
led them to apply to Government for the extension westwards
of the Quetta-Nushki railway.
They pointed out that the recent Turkish advance into West
Persia might compel the increase of the force which Turco-
German plans to bring Persia and Afghanistan into the war
had made it necessary for us to employ in East Persia. The
maintenance of this force by animal transport alone had always
been a very difficult matter, and the recent demands could
not be met without drawing on the camel transport reserved
to meet the case of operations on the North-West Frontier of
India. Therefore, if the existing force was not to be reduced, the
communications must be improved. At one time it had been
hoped that mechanical transport would meet the situation.
But experience and further investigation had shown that the
distances involved were too great and the improvement of the
waterless road too difficult to make it a reliable communication,
even if the 250 motor lorries required could be made available
without interfering with more important demands elsewhere.
As the maintenance of the existing force was dangerously near
a breakdown and the feasibility of a steady and sufficient
mechanical transport service was so doubtful, the provision of
a light railway had been considered. But the railway authori
ties in India was of opinion that the extension of the broad
gauge railway from Nushki, for which material was available,
would be the most economical and satisfactory solution. The
extension of the railway (120 miles) to Dalbandin, which was
the most difficult section of the route for animals and lorries,
then the employment of mechanical transport to Mushki Chah
(130 miles), and thence animals to Robat was suggested as
the most practical solution.
On the 26th July the Government of India addressed the
Secretary of State for India on the subject. After giving the
military reasons for the project as set out above, they also said
that, if the strategical situation compelled us to strengthen our
hold on South Persia, this railway extension would become
essential. But they wished to make it clear that the scheme
could not, for the time being, be supported on commercial or
political grounds. They were uncertain of the cost and would
experience some inconvenience in providing the material for
the permanent way. In fact, it was only on cogent military
grounds that the scheme could be justified and it was for H.M.
Government to decide whether these existed. In any case
they deprecated any limitation of the extension to Dalbandm