"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٩] (٥٦٦/٢٦٢)

MAUDE'S VIEWS
221
on the 25th December would have ended, says Colonel Twigg
in his report, about 3 p.m., but the wounding of Captain
Wittkugel* made it imperative to continue. All ranks of the
Indian troops had behaved splendidly and, although two-
thirds of the South Persia Rifles had shirked fighting, the
remainder had shown considerable gallantry. Colonel Hunter
was specially commended for his intrepid and gallant attempt
to bring in Captain Wittkugel, and Colonel Twigg considered
that there must have been other incidents of individual gallantry
which had escaped notice in the intricacies of the ground.
The suggestion by Sir Percy Sykes and Sir Charles Marling
that a British column should move from Bushire to relieve the
situation on the Shiraz road was not regarded with favour in
India or in Mesopotamia, where it was considered that for the
time being all our efforts and resources should be devoted to
the operations on the Tigris. But the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, being pressed on the matter by the Foreign
Office, telegraphed on the 23rd December that if the Com-
mander-in-Chief in India, after consultation with General
Maude, considered that action from Bushire was practicable
and would produce the desired effect, he could authorise it on
the understanding that commitments entailing possible
subsequent relief operations were to be be definitely avoided.
On being consulted, General Maude telegraphed his views in
some detail. The force to be employed must be adequate if
the risk of failure and of subsequent complications were to be
avoided, he said, while owing to the nature of the country over
which it would have to operate, its line of communication would
be specially vulnerable and it would be faced with great supply
and transport difficulties. The thorough organisation of this
line, both from an administrative and a defence point of view,
would, therefore, be essential before the expedition could start.
Having regard to the difficult physical conditions and calculating
that the enemy would number at least 1,500 to 2,000 rifles,
General Maude considered that the striking force should consist
of one infantry brigade ; while he estimated that the total
strength, excluding the necessary administrative units on the
line of communications, should be one cavalry squadron, four
mountain guns, two hundred mounted infantry and seven
infantry battalions. He deprecated such a fresh commitment,
however, at that stage of the operations in Mesopotamia and
* He Subsequently died of his wounds.
(27782) Q 2
Bushire-
Shirazroad ;
December
1916 .