"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٣] (٥٦٦/٣١١)

268
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
General Allies, as it would allow Germany to transfer a considerable
situation; num k er 0 f troops from her eastern to her western front; and
Oceember ^ enabling her to obtain from Russia much of the food and raw
* material of which she was so urgently in need, would undo mucli
of the advantage we had gained by our blockade. Further,
both we and France had recently been obliged each to send six
divisions to support the defeated Italians ; France was wan
weary and was breaking up divisions ; America was not yet
in a position to give material assistance ; and our own infantry
was much below establishment and likely to become more so.
An early concentration of effort in Europe on our part was
clearly necessary, and fortunately this was rendered feasible
by the fact that our recent successes in Palestine and Meso
potamia had, for the time being, upset the Turco-German plans,
It was consequently decided early in December that an Indian
division should at once go to Palestine from Mesopotamia and
that a considerable number of British troops in Palestine should
be transferred to France and be replaced by Indian troops from
Mesopotamia and India.
As regards the Caucasus and Persia, it was realised that
Russian troops could not be relied upon much longer to provide
an effective barrier to a hostile penetration, which would
enable the enemy to carry the war into Persia and Afghanistan
and to threaten the flanks of our force in Mesopotamia. The
danger of this was, of course, not immediate ; but, to support
the remnant of the Rumanian army and to prevent Germany
obtaining food and raw material, H.M. Government, in agree
ment with their Allies, decided to assist and support any
responsible body in Russia which was prepared to help the
Allied cause. In furtherance of this policy H.M. Government
agreed at the beginning of December to finance the Persian
Cossack Division and to meet any reasonable demands lor
money, etc., for the national forces it was proposed to raise in
Trans-Caucasia. At this period, it may be noted, the tot
strength of the Persian Cossack Division was reported by tiie
British military attache at Tehran to be 5 , 000 , with abou
100 Russian officers. It was distributed in various deta c '
ments in Northern Persia and, though not as efficien
force as the South Persia Rifles, was said to be better than
gendarmerie. , t
Persian The Government of Ain-ud-Daula proved from the on
POllt Brittsh to k 0 incapable of dealing with the difficult national sitna io -
policy ; while the Shah displayed such pusillanimity that it was s ^
December that his deposition was mooted. Among other indication