"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎٠] (٥٦٦/٣٢٥)

282
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
British only attained its existing proportions from lack of oppositio
February and with British troops in Persia it would be easy, he said t
1918 . neighbouring chiefs to destroy its power. If H.M. Government
decided to take this step, he advocated a declaration of the
concessions they were prepared to make to meet Persian wishes
and also an explanation that our action was necessary as a
measure of self-defence. Unless we adopted half measures he
did not anticipate anything but a certain amount of protest
from Persians, while, on the other hand, the majority of the
intelligent part of the population would be relieved at our
forcing the country out of the vacillating policy which they
recognised as fatal to her. We had already had to disregard
Persia's professed neutrality in the east, south and south-west
and, as circumstances were likely to compel us sooner or later
to use troops in the north-west also, it seemed better to act at
once than to drag on negotiations which entailed ever-increasing
concessions.
Four days later, Sir Charles Marling again urged H.M,
Government to despatch troops into North-West Persia. The
Jangali movement, the German peace with the Ukraine and the
immobility of the British force in Mesopotamia all combined
to cause the Persian Government to procrastinate, and he
considered further negotiations with them to be waste of time,
Additional concessions would bring us no more converts from
the Democrat party; and the extremists, who would always be
irreconcilable, would collapse before an exhibition of force.
The Government of India, however, did not agree with Sir
Charles Marling and still advocated a policy of conciliation to
win over the Persian Government and people and induce them
to maintain the South Persia Rifles and the Persian Cossacks
in an efficient state. The Indian authorities said that they saw
no immediate likelihood of a Turco-German thrust into North
Persia and they thought that the Persian Cossacks should
suffice to avert the immediate danger from enemy emissaries
and acts of brigandage. On the other hand, if we were to employ
force it would have to be on a scale sufficient to overawe the
country completely, and there were military and political
objections to such a course. In default of serious provocation,
it would finally discredit us in Persian eyes and it would be so
misrepresented elsewhere as to bring on us the odium of the
whole Moslem world.
Sir Charles Marling considered that these views from India
were largely based on erroneous premises. The immediate
German object, he said, was to bring Persia into the war against