"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎١‎٧‎٠] (٥٦٦/٣٤٥)

296
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
East Persia; objections to British action there. But in that month they
April 1918. p ro tested against our road-making operations in Seistan and
Kain and our railway extension towards the Persian frontier
while in Meshed itself extremist Democrats gave us considerable
trouble by their propaganda, their attempts to prevent us
obtaining supplies, and their active obstruction to our famine
relief measures. The situation was further complicated to our
disadvantage by the intrigues of Russian reactionaries and
Bolsheviks, both of whom regarded our presence in North
Persia with disfavour. As the situation held out danger from
the threat, and possible use, of force, General Dale reported
that he found it necessary to reinforce his garrison at Meshed.
His request that the remaining half-battalion 98th Infantry
should be sent from India to join him was accordingly
sanctioned.
By the end of March, the Nushki railway extension had
reached to within fifty miles of Mirjawa on the Persian frontier;
and early in April the Government of India proposed to the
India Office that, in view of the general situation, it would be
advisable to carry out reconnaissance surveys, northwards
towards Birjand and westwards towards Rigan, in case further
railway extension became imperative.
H.M. Government deprecated the proposal as raising questions
of a far-reaching character, and suggested that an extension
in British territory from Mirjawa to Robat would answer
requirements. To this the Government of India replied on
the 26th April that, in view of the probable increase of enemy
activity in Persia and of a possible enemy movement along the
Russian railways towards Afghanistan, they regarded a railway
extension towards Neh as a precautionary measure of great
importance. It would enable us to counteract enemy action
in East Persia, would exercise a steadying influence on
Afghanistan without appearing to menace her and, by
threatening a hostile advance towards western Afghanistan,
would compel the enemy to dispersion or detachment of forces.
The suggested extension to Robat, they continued, was open to
topographical objections and might be construed as a direct
menace to Afghanistan. They, therefore, proposed that the
railway should run from Mirjawa, via Duzdab and west of the
Hamun, to some point in Persia within striking distance of
Farah in western Afghanistan. They realised the objections to
extending the railway into Persia, but the necessity for defending
our own and Afghan interests and for preventing enemy activity
in East Persia seemed to them to justify us, in all the
circumstances of the case, in taking this action.