"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٢] (٥٦٦/٣٤٨)

299
THE ENEMY IN TRANS-CAUCASIA
By their occupation of Sevastopol on the 1st May and their The Caucasus
seizure of a portion of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the Germans ^ est pg rs i a .
had gained a route to Trans-Caucasia on which they would be Ist _ IIt h
quite independent of Turkey—a factor of considerable advan- May 1918 .
tage having regard to the divergent aims of the two countries.
Georgia was entirely pro-German and a German military
detachment* had already reached Tiflis, which the British
military mission, finding itself in a dangerous and impossible
position, was forced to leave on the 3rd May for Vladikavkas.
On the other hand, the Bolsheviks, alarmed by Turco-German
action, were fighting the Tartars and were less inclined to resent
the idea of British assistance in Trans-Caucasia. But the War
Office decided on the 4th May that the situation in the Caucasus
did not permit of General Dunsterville’s acceptance of the
Armenian invitation to Baku, though it was hoped that he
might be able to reach Enzeli and gain control of the Caspian
fleet. The sympathies of the Tartars were all with the Turks,
whose advance in Trans-Caucasia was now directed towards
Russian as well as towards Persian Azerbaijan and whose
intentions, according to Nuri Pasha, who arrived at Tabriz with
a Turkish staff on the 6th May, were to take over the Moslem
areas in the Caucasus and to fight the Armenians.
The converging advance of Turkish troops on Tabriz seemed
to be hanging fire, owing apparently in part to the resistance
they encountered from the Jelus and Armenians in the Urmia
region, and also, possibly, to a slight extent to the British
operations towards Kirkuk which had just started. But, as
pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief in India on the 3rd
May, these operations provided neither an effective counter to
the Turkish penetration of Persian Azerbaijan nor the military
demonstration in West Persia which Sir Charles Marling at
Tehran required and expected. General Monro accordingly
recommended that we should utilise all the available transport
in Mesopotamia to carry out out original intention of moving
troops along the Hamadan road. On the 11th May General
Dunsterville reported that a good opportunity had occurred for
Bicharakoff to proceed to Baku and gain control of the Caspian,
but that, as there were no British troops in the Hamadan area
to relieve his men, Bicharakoff could not be spared from Kazvin.
At this time also, owing to the Turkish threat to Tabriz, which
perturbed them greatly, the Persian Government and Persians
generally were more likely to welcome a display of force by the
* A regiment formed locally of German colonists and ex-prisoners of war
and 800 Ukraine troops under German officers.