"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٧] (٥٦٦/٣٧٨)

REINFORCEMENTS FROM INDIA
325
Saulat, he said, was near Khan-i-Khabis with 9,000 Qashqais ;
there was a body of Kazerunis about Khan-i-Zinian ; and most
of Ears province had turned hostile as the result of anti-British
propaganda. Most of the Arab tribes would probably join
Saulat; and, though the Ears Brigade of the South Persia
Rifles would probably desert or revolt, its disbandment was
at the moment undesirable as likely to precipitate matters and
to have untoward results at Abadeh, Dehbid, Niriz and in
Kerman. In the last-named province there was only the half
battalion Indian infantry at Saidabad, and it was possible that
the Kerman Brigade, South Persia Rifles, might become dis
affected. Sir Percy Sykes accordingly recommended that at
least two squadrons of cavalry, one mountain battery and an
infantry battalion should be sent from India to move to Saidabad
from Bandar Abbas.
In consequence, it was decided to send to Bandar Abbas from
India a squadron each of the 26th and 27th Light Cavalry,
one section 35th Mountain Battery, headquarters and the
remaining half-battalion 120th Infantry, 200 men as drafts
for the 16th Rajputs and three sections of an Indian field
ambulance. This was in addition to two companies 3rd
Brahmans sent from Muscat to garrison Bandar Abbas.
On the 5th June the Government of India addressed the
India Office on the situation in Ears. They regarded Saulat’s
rising as a definite expression of Persian nationalist resentment
at our interference. We were powerless to deal with it till the
autumn, when we were being forced into a serious military di
version such as the Germans had been trying to lure us into for the
past two years. We would experience great difficulty in carrying
out these operations, whose limits it was difficult to foresee and
whose effect on other Moslem tribes and nations was likely to
be unfavourable. The Government of India consequently
urged earnest consideration of some other alternative. They
themselves advocated an attempt to effect a peaceful settle
ment through the Persian Government—whenever a stable one
was established, and after our troops had reached the coast—by
conciliatory measures. We should, they considered, be pre
pared to hand over or disband the South Persia Rifles and to
withdraw the Indian troops in Ears on assurances that our
consuls and colonies would be protected. The original reasons
for the inception of the South Persia Rifles had ceased, they
said, and our position in Mesopotamia and on the Perso-
Baluch border was much stronger than it was in 1916, while
for the time being our only vital interests lay in North-West
and East Persia.