"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [و‎‎١‎٩‎٧] (٥٦٦/٣٩٨)

BRITISH POLICY
343
For he seemed to be entirely under German influence and was
sceptical regarding our ability to despatch sufficient troops to
carry out our declared intention of securing Persian neutrality
by military means. The advent to power of a friendly Persian
Cabinet would, continued the British Minister, undoubtedly
counteract the danger arising from the serious situation in
Central and South Persia. But, as the consciousness of this
danger militated against that advent, the only solution was the
despatch of a strong military force to Kazvin to reinforce
General Dunsterville. It was, moreover, the only way of keep
ing Vossuk-ud-Daula in office, once he had been appointed, and
of thus obviating the increased danger which would result if he
again fell from power. This telegram crossed one from the
Foreign Office sent on the 1st July authorising Sir Charles
Marling—if the situation was as serious as the Government of
India depicted it—to make any conciliatory offers which he
thought desirable or necessary, though he would, of course,
weigh well the dangers of yielding to Persian violence what we
had refused to their arguments.
The discussion continued. As their orders to General Marshall
showed, H.M. Government recognised the great importance of
increasing as far as possible our forces in North-West Persia,
and they also still considered that it was desirable to supple
ment these forces by local levies. The concessions they were
prepared to offer were to facilitate the advent of a friendly
Cabinet and to enable it to restore order in Pars, where British
military measures which would affect the situation immediately
were not possible.
Sir Charles Marling considered that the offer of concessions
was useless and that the only practical policy was to bring about
a change of Cabinet by a very early display of effective military
strength. The Government of India, on the other hand, still
advocated a policy of conciliation, as they were afraid of further
serious and indefinite military commitments in Persia, which—
apart from purely military disadvantages—were, in their
opinion, calculated to react unfavourably on Moslem opinion
in neighbouring countries and also on future Indo-Persian
relations. They felt that our policy in Persia was being dictated
without sufficient regard to our military resources—a condition
due, they considered, to the divorce between political and
military control, which they had previously, and still, wished to
obviate by the appointment of a senior military officer com
bining both functions in Southern Persia. To enable them to
exercise effectively the military control in that area—which