"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎١] (٥٦٦/٤٠٧)

352
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
British and they continued, to risk estranging him or impairing his authority,
Persian on w pi c p we were bound to rely, as well as on his advice, so long
regarding as Persia remained neutral. On the same day, however, the
the South Government of India telegraphed to the India Office, quoting
^R’fles 1 * correspondence as evidence of the impossibility of separa-
August 1918! ting military from political control, and recommending that, as
the retention in their hands of military control was essential,
the political control of Pars should also be vested in them until
the situation cleared. H.M. Government, however, merely
replied, on the 12th August, that they agreed that Farman
Farma must be supported.
Vossuk himself was so anxious for an immediate settlement
of the South Persia Rifles question that, two days after his
advent to office, he suggested to the British Minister that a
few selected Swedish officers should be substituted for all or
most of the British officers, to whose presence he attributed the
recent trouble in Pars. During the ensuing discussion he said
that he doubted if even the most formal recognition of the
South Persia Rifles by his Government would restore the
loyalty of the force for some time to come, and it seemed to
him that, unless we agreed to a control by neutral officers, we
should find it necessary continually to increase our forces in
the country, however much we disliked that course.
Sir Charles Marling, in reporting this discussion to London,
said that as neither the Indian troops nor the South Persia
Rifles were able to carry out their intended functions, the old
pernicious system of arrangements with tribal chiefs for the
maintenance of order was again being resorted to. He there
fore considered that the Indian troops should be reinforced
sufficiently to enable them to deal with any probable tn a
combination. As regards the South Persia Rifles, he though
that the only alternatives were to agree to Vossuk’s suggestion
or to place a Persian officer in command with a British sta _
Even if a suitable Persian could be found, however, he wou
be generally regarded as having been sold to us ; whereas even
Persians would regard a Swedish chief as a guarantee tha
force would no longer be used for British, as opposed to P ersia ’
purposes. Moreover, though we should have to con ^ mue s
bear the cost in either case, under a Swedish officer the ex P^ n i g
could be cut down. Sir Charles Marling was well aware 0 ,
numberless difficulties attending Vossuk's proposal, u
thought that we should take advantage of the oppor
presented by the advent of a friendly Cabinet to come 0
arrangement.