"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٤] (٥٦٦/٤١٣)

358
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
The of Baku and were also shortly sending a force with guns for the
Malleson defence of Krasnovodsk, for the safety of which the Trans-
Missi on and Caspian Government were very anxious.
Caspia ; Next day General Malleson learnt that the Trans-Caspian
August 1918 . force driven back by the Bolsheviks to Bairam Ali,
on the eastern edge of the Merv oasis, on which the Trans-
Caspian Government were largely dependent for Turkoman man
power and supplies. Its loss, moreover, would probably also
induce the garrison of Kushk, with its large amount of war
material, to declare definitely for the Bolsheviks.
Telegraphing on the 10th August, General Malleson considered
that it would be too great a risk to send the 175 Indian in
fantry from Muhammadabad to Merv. But he might save
Merv, he said, if he made up this detachment to 500 rifles, as
he could do by denuding Meshed of most of its garrison. On the
other hand, the 175 infantry could be sent to Krasnovodsk, being
joined there by guns sent from Enzeli, and he personally
favoured that alternative. In a second telegram sent on the
same day General Malleson reported the receipt of two tele
graphic appeals from the Turkestan Union for guns and military
assistance for Krasnovodsk, where they said the situation
was very critical. From these General Malleson assumed that
information had been received at Askabad of the imminent
departure from Astrakhan of Bolshevik troops for Krasnovodsk.
In repeating these telegrams to the War Office, the Com-
mander-in-Chief in India said that to secure Merv seemed less
important than to block the enemy road eastward of the
Caspian. He added that he was pushing 500 men up to Meshed
as fast as the backward state of the railway communications
permitted and that Colonel R. St. C. Battine, who had reached
Krasnovodsk on the 6 th August from Enzeli, should be asked
for his views regarding the urgent necessity of troops for
Krasnovodsk. This telegram was repeated to General Malleson
for his guidance, as it was assumed that he was in constant
communication with Colonel Battine. General Malleson,
however, replied that he did not know what cipher Colone
Battine held and that it was most undesirable to mention the
Turkestan Union in any telegram, as the Trans-Caspian
Government, who were unaware of our negotiations with tha
movement, regarded it as a treasonable conspiracy to e
ruthlessly rooted out.
On the 12th August the Chief of the General Staff in In ^
wired an appreciation of the situation on the Caspian to
Malleson showing that, as long as Baku held out, Krasnovo s