"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٣] (٥٦٦/٤٥١)

396
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
admiration for the part played by the British and Indian
troops, whom they regarded as being equal to ten times their
own number of any of the other combatants.
Trans- As the first reports that reached General Malleson at Meshed
Caspia ; G f ^ fighting at Dushak were of rather an alarming character
c o er 191 . ^ SU gg es ted on the 15th October to Army Headquarters in
India that if it were proposed to send him any additional troops
it would be as well to despatch them at an early date. He had
no troops at Meshed available either to reinforce Trans-Caspia
or to replace casualties there. On the 16th he gave the total
estimated casualties as 178 and asked urgently for their re
placement. He also suggested that a cavalry regiment should
be sent from India forthwith as a first reinforcement. In
consequence of these telegrams, orders were sent from Simla to
General Wapshare at Quetta on the 17th October to despatch
to Meshed as early as possible the headquarters and two re
maining squadrons of the 41st Cavalry—a newly raised unit, in
which the squadrons 15th and 37th Lancers already sent to
East Persia had been embodied ; and at the same time arrange
ments were made to mobilise the 42nd Cavalry as a further
reinforcement.
These orders crossed a telegram from General Malleson sub
mitting further considerations affecting the question of future
British intentions in Turkestan. The whole country was in a
state of anarchy and he did not think that an armistice in
Europe would have any effect on it. The Trans-Caspian Govern
ment was incompetent and powerless, and a Turkoman bid for
power was possible. This would mean a pan-Islamic rising and
continued anarchy, possibly spreading to Khurasan and Herat.
Our very small force could hardly stop a Bolshevik advance in
strength into Trans-Caspia, which we were pledged to defend
against all enemies, an expression interpreted everywhere in
Trans-Caspia as including the Bolsheviks. British troops were
urgently required, as the Russians could not be depended upon.
In conclusion, General Malleson expressed the opinion that the
whole of Trans-Caspia could be quickly recovered by a force
of three cavalry regiments, three batteries, an infantry brigade
and a few armoured cars and aeroplanes.
On the 18th October the Government of India received a
telegram sent the previous day by the India Office regarding
the difficulty of obtaining currency in Persia, in which they
requested that General Malleson should be warned not to
commit H.M. Government to any financial assistance to t e
Trans-Caspian Government beyond what had already been