"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٦] (٥٦٦/٤٥٧)

402
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
Trans- and the political objections to action calculated to disturb
Number Afghanistan and to embarrass the Amir. The telegram then
° Ve ^i8! went on to point out that the authority given him in the past
to support the Trans-Caspian Government had been issued as
the best means of closing the Trans-Caspian railway to enemy
elements, i.e., one of the main objects of his Mission ; and that,
although the support he could give the Trans-Caspian Govern
ment in future was limited, it should suffice to free them,
during their operations beyond Merv, from anxiety in regard
to their base and communications.
On the 8th November General Wapshare at Quetta was told
by the Chief of the General Staff in India that owing to the
altered military situation it had been decided to stop the move
ment of the six squadrons of cavalry en route or under orders
to Meshed and to maintain the force at and beyond that place
at a strength of a field battery, a British infantry battalion
and machine gun section, an Indian cavalry regiment and an
Indian infantry battalion. He was also requested to consider
the possibility of reducing the strength of the cavalry, infantry
and levies in East Persia. Next day he was informed that, if
circumstances permitted, it was intended eventually to with
draw from Trans-Caspia, leaving the Mission in Meshed with
an escort of two squadrons of cavalry and an infantry company.
General Malleson on the 9th November again urged a
reconsideration of the order to withdraw from Merv. The
agreement which he had been authorised to make with the
Trans-Caspian Government was, he said, regarded by them as
one of mutual advantages and responsibilities entailing a
combination for defence against the enemies of both parties.
Consequently, if we cried off our bargain now that the fortunes
of war had disposed of Turks and Germans while the Bolsheviks
remained, we should be accused of the grossest ill-faith. He
asked if it was not permissible for him to continue to act on
the authorisation and policy of H.M. Government communi
cated to him at the beginning of August. As housing facilities
elsewhere were inadequate, he continued, withdrawal from
Merv entailed withdrawal to Askabad, which would be regarded
as proof of our intention—already widely ascribed to us by
our enemies—to seize Trans-Caspia. Before announcing our
withdrawal it would be essential to evacuate our wounded from
Askabad to save them from the mob, and, if H.M. Governmen
desired to retain it, to complete the garrison of Krasnovods
and stock it fully. The moment was particularly unfavoura e
for such an announcement. The Trans-Caspian Governmen