"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٥‎١] (٥٦٦/٥٠٩)

446
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
Trans-
Caspia ;
February
1919-
line, but lacking the support of a strong British contingent had
neither the men nor the ammunition to carry it out. Moreover
the recent Bolshevik capture of Orenburg* had considerably
altered the situation to our disadvantage, as they would now be
able to obtain support from Moscow. The small number of British
troops, who were the only real obstacle to a Bolshevik advance,
the military inefficiency of our allies and the scarcity of arms and
ammunition rendered the situation so unsatisfactory that it
could not be allowed to continue, and in this General Malleson
agreed with him. We must either, he concluded, help the local
Government financially and with troops, arms and ammunition,
or we must withdraw altogether.
The first of these alternatives would mean bringing up more
Indian troops so as to render the position secure, the minimum
force required in Trans-Caspia, in his opinion, being a cavalry
regiment, a battery of artillery, four infantry battalions, and
some aeroplanes and heavy guns. The conditions were unsuit
able for British infantry and they should be replaced by Indian
infantry. In addition, the armament and organisation of
Turkomans would have to be considered and, though this
would stir up prejudices, they might well be ignored. In this
connection he thought that the formation of a Turkoman State
merited consideration, though their treatment of Russians was
difficult to foresee. The necessity of holding the Merv oasis was
obvious, but strikes at Baku, other difficulties and the mainten
ance of shipping on the Caspian added to possible mischances
on the requisite long line of communications.
In regard to the second alternative General Malleson con
sidered that we were in honour bound to support the local
administration. But General Milne failed to see how we could
do so except as he had stated above. They had done little to
maintain an army, and General Malleson himself admitted that
we were bolstering up a lot of effete Russians. General Malleson
considered that, before we withdrew, we should make the front
safe by advancing to the Oxus. But General Milne did not
believe that we could do this with the means at our disposal in
view of the latest change in the situation, and he considered
that a withdrawal should not be difficult from a military point
of view, though it might be so politically if the inhabitants
turned against us or a railway strike occurred. It would be
necessary to give the local administration money, arms and
ammunition if we withdrew. General Milne would also prefer
to abandon Krasnovodsk, as it would not be easy to hold and
* This had occurred on the 22nd January.