"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [و‎‎٢‎٥‎٨] (٥٦٦/٥٢٢)

POLICY
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0n the 7th March the Government of India telegraphed to
the India Office that General Douglas proposed a settlement on
the following lines : acceptance of Saulat’s offer to submit
at Tehran under guarantee of life and property j the reduction
as soon as Saulat left for Tehran, of the British force to two
squadrons of cavalry, a mountain battery, three infantry
battalions and a flight of aeroplanes ] and the issue of a pro
clamation that these troops would also withdraw as soon as
the rebel Khans surrendered unconditionally. As these terms
seemed to them unlikely to afford us an escape from an expen
sive entanglement, the Government of India did not approve
of them and recommended that we should “ cut our losses ”
and lay down a definite date for the withdrawal of our forces.*
This would, they considered, force the local authorities to
devise a policy which would stand on its merits without an
indefinite backing of military force and which would probably
centre round a thorough-going settlement with Saulat as the
one possible Il-Khani of the Qashqais. They pointed out that
we were not in a position to crush Saulat and that, as all parties
to the contest were anxious for peace, it would have to be
made with “ face-saving ” all round. They suggested that
Saulat should be made to submit to Farman Farma, who was
reported to be nervous of any settlement with Saulat and
especially of his being allowed scope to intrigue at Tehranf ;
and that Farman Farma, who was the man who would have
to see the arrangements through, should be left to settle matters,
in his own Persian way, with Saulat.
Sir Percy Cox, however, considering that there were strong
objections to this complete reversal of our attitude towards
Saulat, supported strongly the proposals made by General
Douglas. Sir P. Cox explained that he had hitherto hoped that
the result of our military operations and the development of
the general political situation would have rendered it possible
for our troops to withdraw before the hot weather, and he did
not even now contemplate their retention beyond the end of
that period. But until Farman Farma’s arrangements were in
working order, the conclusion of the Peace Conference and the
effective inauguration of our future policy in regard to P e rsia,
he considered that the proportion of the force recommended by
General Douglas should remain. For, having due regard to
[ ey recommended that the bulk of the force should be withdrawn at
nd the remainder by the 1st May. ( aniU-v
seems possible, they said, that these feelings “ os ® f r °®. * S “ ^
ince, as there was good reason to believe Farman Far
y or indirectly concerned in Saulat’s original defection.
2 H