ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎١‎٥‎١] (٤٨١/٢٩٨)

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Dated Basrah, the 10th January 1916.
From-TheHosW LrecTESMi-CoLoSEi Sib P. Z. Cos, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Political Be,ident
To-Tho MB A. U GaaKT, C ar., C.I.E., Poreigi, Socrotary to th, Gorommont of
India in the Foieign and Political Department.
I send herewith for your, information a copy of a memorandum, I recorded for Army
Commander, regarding my interview with Bin Saud on 26th December.
Note regarding interview with —
(.Z) Bin Saud on 26th December 1915.
[2) Shaikh of Kuwait on 31st December 1915.
With reference to recent reports from various sources, the following is the gist of the
views expressed by Ibn S^ud during my meeting with him on 26th December.
It is $rue that he received a slight flesh wound in the recent fighting with the Aiman
but it did not lay him up and is now quite healed.
He expressed a much more colourless opinion regarding the reported activities of the
Turks m Central Arabia than that imparted by his late doctor to the Political Agent at
Bahrain. He says there is no doubt that the Turks are taking advantage of recent develop
ments in Europe and the suspension of our advance towards Baghdad in order to endeavour
to rekindle tribal and religious feding against us, but he does not believe that there will be f
much result, and as far as Iraq is concerned is confident that some measure of unrest which at
present prevails will subside as soon as we move on again.
With reference to the rumour of the intended purchase of forty thousand camels by the
Turks, he states that the popular report is that they are required firstly for the transport of '
grain to Constantinople and then for military transport towards Egypt. He discredits these
stories and believes the explanation to be that the Turks are endeavouring to bribe tribal
Shaikhs generally to co-operate with them and find that the bribe is more easily digested if
offered as an advance “ for investment in camels or horses in case the Government should
require them.” He says he received an overture in this form a few months ago.
He seems to have been somewhat exaggerating in his conversations with the Political
Agent, Bahrain, before my arrival and admits that he has no accurate news yet regarding the
whereabouts of Ibn Rashid. He says that it is certain that he has moved out of Hail, but
how far, and whether to the west or east, he does not yet know. As, however, it w-'uld be a
natural course for Bin Rashid to endeavour to harass him in Kasim, he has sent his brother on
ahead to maintain vigilance in that quarter while he himself proceeds to his capital at Riyaz
in order to be sure that unrest created by Turkish emissaries does not spread among his
tribesmen.
The letters which he intercepted in transit from Bin Rashid and Ajaimi to some of his
disaffected relatives and the Ajman Shaikhs do not amount to much and he does not really
regard them seriously, his behef being that Ibn Rashid would not dare to advance too far
either towards Kuwait or Nasiriyah for fear lest Bin Saud should cut in against Hail, in his
rear. He believes that this tall talk will subside when we advance again, and says that in
any case the advance of any large force at present is out of the question owing to the absence
of rain and grazing. He thinks it is more probable that Bin Rashid will begin making
overtures to him and, if he does, he, Bin Saud, will offer to be reconciled with him on condition
that he comes over to us or, failing that, agrees to remain absolutely neutral. If Bin Rashid
will not accept either of these conditions, he, Bin Saud, will attack him and incite the '
Anaizeh to attack him also.
In the event of our wanting him to co-operate actively in the direction of Basrah or
Nasiriyah, Bin Saud says he could move up towards Kuwait and Zubair, but not towards
Nasiriyah, as the grazing and watering places on that line ^are out of his tribal sphere and
his action would arouse hostility. He recommends our making much of Hamud bin Suwait
and the Zaiyad Shaikhs and employing them to hold the desert on the Nasiriyah side.
As regards the Sherif, he said his present relations with him were quite normal and
friendly but that the Sherif was essentially a trivial and unstable character and could never
be depended upon. There was no truth in the former reports that the Sheriffs son had moved
towards Hail with a large force to co-operate with Bin Rashid and he did not credit the
present reports pointing to any active understanding between the Sherif and Bin Rashid. As
regards the recent movement of Sheriffs son towards Kasim, he thought it was quite conceiv
able that having learnt that Bin Saud was having trouble with the Ajman the Sherif had
sent his son up to fish in troubled waters, but that in any case when the son reached Kasim
he realised that Bin Saud was getting the better of the Ajman and abandoned any unneigh-
bourly intentions which he may possibly have had. All he did was to punish a section of the
Ataiba who had refused to pay Zakat and then return home.