ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎١‎٥‎٩] (٤٨١/٣١٤)

ho over-ieached himiGelf, how€VPr f lor his own history
is full of intimate relations with foreigners (Turks,
British, and. others), and was confounded. He was
therefore forced out of the Hedjaz, and went hack to
CONSTANTINOPLE. He is ambitious, energetic, and well
educated. lie has thrown himself on the Turkish side,
working for & reformed Islam (i.e., an Islam which
sha.ll he not a faith, hut a political weapon), and
iius the sworn promise of the Government that he shall
succeed Hussein, as soon as the latter can he removed.
3herif Hussein is not working in the British
interests, except in so far as they further the
particular dreams and hopes of the political party to
which he belongs. His aim is the establishment of a
Khalifate (not the only one$ for himself, and
independence for people speaking Arabic from their
present irritating subjection to people speaking Turk.
His aims are thus in definite opposition to the Pan-
Islamlc party, who are his strong obstacle, and to the
Young Turk party, who are however less dangerous to his
schemes; his activity seems beneficial to us, because
it marches with our immediate aims, the break up of
the Islamic '’bloc" and the defeat and disruption of the
Ottoman Empire, and because the states he would set up
to succeed the Turks would be as harmless to ourselves
as Turkey was before she became a tool in German hands.
The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If
properly handled they would remain in a state of
political mosaic, s tissue of small jealous principal
ities, incapable of cohesion, and yet always ready to
combine against an outside lorce. ib.e alternative to
this