ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎١‎٩‎٨] (٤٨١/٣٩٢)

Further a treaty of alliance uith Entente Powers giving them for duration
of war tree movement in Greater Arabia and use of railways in Arabian area.
Entente troops in Arab tracts ( ? ) to be on same footing of British troops in
hlanders. On cessation of hostilities Entente troops to evacuate territories.
Faruki insisted that this was dependent on Entente landing troops at a
point between Mersina and Alexandretta and making good Cilician Gates or
Amanus Pass. He further stipulated that until this had been done Sheriff
should not take action. I agree any other course is out of the question and
that to call Arabs or Sheriff to take action until we had made above mentioned
passes secure would be an impossibility. Faruki urged also necessity for
immediate naval (?) action in Gulf Alexandretta, adding that Germans would
forest all them if Entente did not take this opportunity and Arabs would in
their own interests be forced to (?) reconsider situation once Turks or Germans
got into Syria. For my own part I am sure that there can be no doubt of
Arabs merely trouble Great Britain (?) Turks in advance on Canal. If we
alloAv Turks into Syria Arabs will in order to obtain special consideration side
with (?) them. Idea of Turco-Arabia on same lines as Austria-Hungary has
already been suggested by Germans.
I will give observations on less important aspects in further telegram. I
am convinced of necessity meanwhile for efficient action at earliest" possible
moment to enable Arabs to move.
32
Telegram P,, dated the 25th (received 26th) November 1915.
From—The British High Commissioner of Egypt, Cairo,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi.
(Note. — Place names in following message subject to revision.)
Repetition of my telegram^709 to Foreign Office, November 21st, is as
follows :—
Begins. Following No. 20 for Director of Military Operations from Sir
M. Sykes
I submit in continuation of my telegram No. 19 on hypothesis that Faruki’s
interviews is basis of our arrangements with Arabs.
1 . Our task with regard to France and Arabs is to get Arabs to concede
to French as much as possible and to get our Haiffa Outlet and Palestine
included in our sphere of enterprise in form of French concessions to us.
Thus we smooth way for France wuth Syrians and in matter where France has
a traditional interest in dealings directly with her.
Note. —Any extension of our sphere of enterprise will always be welcomed
by Arabs.
2. I do not consider with regard to Arabia proper that proposed Arab
movement affects our position with regard to Rfid Sea and Varna Gulf
interests. Gulf and Aden treaties wall hold good and I am confident that
suzerainty of Sheriff in Arabia proper will be purely honorary in practice.
3. With regard to our posicion in Iraq our control (?) of civil Government
must hold for whole (?) duration of war and we should stipulate for this.
Basrah and Baghdad provinces are divided from Arabia by schism and are too
disorderly and rancourous for new-born State to control. When timeloi evacua
tion comes Sheriff s Government will have to settle (.) Shiah and Iveibala ques
tion and I anticipate w ill be glad enough in order to get rex enue to get us to
run matters (?) for them for some time to come. ^ Arab nation isolated has little
influence and Ivhalifate none south of Baghdad in cultivated area.
4 I submit for strategical and political consideration of India that so long
as it is protected from German and Turkish influence by France and ourselves
suggested Arab State cannot become a formidable power in itself.
0 °5 In the event of our giving Arabs their opportunity I anticipate that
matters will shape themselves as follows Influx of money and trade owing to