ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٤] (٤٨١/٤٤٤)

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POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
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From Jiieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M.P., to
tlie Director of Military Operations.
Xo. 2o. S.S. Khyber, Red Sea,
^* r > 15th November 1915.
I have tlie honour to forward to you (by favour of Mr. S. Waterheld,
Political Agent, Haraoti and Tonk, Rajputana, who is proceeding to London
by this mail), under this cover a memorandum resuming the impressions I
have received on various points as the result of my tour of the Eastern
theatre.
f have dated it 28th October, as that is the last date on which 1 was in
touch with the situation. I would therefore point out that my observations
regarding the despatch of reinforcements to Mesopotamia are based on the
forces actually in Mesopotamia at the end of October. I heard at Karachi
that a division, less certain minor units, was under orders, but 1 have not
presumed this in tlie memorandum.
1 have made no observations with regard to Persia or the Persian side
of the Gulf, as that region did not come within the scope of my instructions,
and my previous experience gives me no assistance with regard to those
parts. I lowever, my personal opinion is that the occupation of Ahwaz is,
and has been, a source of great weakness to us, but 1 assume that the
necessities of the Admiralty, and the maintenance of our prestige m Persia,
make it retention essential. If it was merely a question of the interests of
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I should believe it would be best to abandon
Ahwaz and compensate the Company for any damage that might ensue.
I do not believe that even if the Bakhtiaris turned against us they could
venture far afield, or co-operate with the Turks in Mesopotamia.
I would also point out that my assumption of 30,000 'Turks in Syria in
my note on the general military situation is based on information of about
18th October. From rumours L have since heard I imagine it is possible
that this number has greatly increased, from which I infer that the release
of Constantinople troops began with the entrance of Bulgaria into the held.
However, I still believe that the blocking of the Cilician Gates is important
to us, and that we cannot afford to let the Turks assume a constant
offensive against -Egvpt and Mesopotamia, and that we should take
advantage of the snow barrier which cuts off Syria and Mesopotamia from
Armenia and Anatolia to improve our position for the opening of the spring
campaign. i i ,1
1 think that the Mesopotamian operations demonstrate very clearlj the
superiority of our troops over the Turks in manoeuvre, and show that, where
onen fighting and flanking movement is possible, we can beat them on a
proportion of 10 British led troops to 16 Turks. However, I must qualify
this bv pointing out that, whatever the individual merit of the soldiers o
the Mesopotamian force (a large proportion of which is Indian), the\ me e.
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