ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎١] (٤٨١/٤٥٨)

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SECRET.
POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
II.
Select Ke()orts and Telegrams from Sir Mark Sykes.
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Sir
No. 4 (Secret).
Atliens,
| 12th June 1915.
1 have the honour to report that to-day, with the approval of
Sir Francis Elliot, I interviewed Ills Highness Prince Sabah-ed-Din at the
house of Mr. F. F. \\ hittall. His Highness made a lengthy statement
regarding the intentions and aspirations of the political party of which he is
leader. He stated that his party had suffered a great deal at the hands of
the Committee and the Germans, that a great number of its leaders were in
prison, that 29 military officers belonging to it had been shot, and that
people had been sent to Athens from Constantinople with orders to kill him
at the first opportunity. However, he considered his party strong in the
Smyrna garrison, numerous in Constantinople, and popular among the
masses of the Turkish people, but he had to admit that in Gallipoli neither
among the officers nor men were there any adherents of his cause. He
further stated that he had no communications either with the Arabs in Syria
or the Armenians in Zeitun or Eastern Armenia. His hope was to obtain
assistance from the Allies to provoke a military revolution in Smyrna, extend
it to Constantinople, overthrow the existing Government and make separate
terms of peace with the Allies ; his idea being that with a revolution at the
Capital the Turco-German resistance at Dardanelles would collapse, lie
made it quite clear that this course would be impossible without assistance
from the Allies, but did not specify what form the assistance should take.
The terms of peace which His Highness had in mind in event of such a
scheme being feasible were as follows :
(i.) The cession of certain small territories to the Allies, from which I
inferred the Lebanon to France, llasra to Great Britain, and a
slight modification of the Russo-Turkish boundary in Asia
however, on this point His Highness was not precise, partly
perhaps owing to his not having a very clear geographical
knowledge of Asiatic Turkey.
(ii.) The neutralization of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and the
dismantling of the forts.
(dii.) The retention of Constantinople by Turkey.
(iv.) The adoption of a wide scheme of reforms, including decentralization
and the establishment of local autonomy in all parts of the
Empire, under a scheme of regions compatible with national
aspirations.
(v.) The transfer of the Caliphate by the Sultan to a member of the
Koraysh.
He cited, as a support to his hopes that such terms would be acceptable
to the Allies, the British declaration that our war was with the existing
Turkish Government and not with the Ottoman people.
His Highness further informed me that in the event of the Allies being
unwilling to help him in such a venture, he might, if he had their
approval, bring about a revolution on similar lines when Gallipoli had fallen,
but before Constantinople was taken, lie thought that perhaps the Allies
might be willing to forego the capture of Const^ order to spare
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