ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٨] (٤٨١/٤٧٢)

15
to meet situation both as regards France and Great Britain. Arabs would
agree to accept as approximate northern frontier Alexandretta Aintab-
Berijik-l rfa-Midiyat-Zakho-Kowanduz.. Arabs would agree to convention
with France, granting her a monopoly of all concessionary enterprise in
Syria and Palestine, Syria being delined as bounded by Euphrates as far
south as Deir Zor and from thence to Deraa, and along llejaz railway to
Ma’an.
llejaz railway as far south as Amman could be sold to French conces
sionaires. Arabs would further agree to employ none but Frenchmen as
advisers, and European employees in this area. Note Arabs will not under
take to employ Europeans if they can do without them, but Faruki points
out that this stipulation is to avoid any shadow of control. Arabs would
agree to all French educational establishments having special recognition in
this area.
Arabs would agree to an identical convention with Great Britain as
regards the remainder of greater Arabia, viz., Irak and Jazirah, and North
Mesopotamia. Further, Arabs would agree to any territory north of the
greater Arabian frontier being French possessions under the French Hag.
Arabs would agree to Basra town and all cultivated lands ro the south
being British territory.
Arabs would be prepared to make a treaty with the Entente Powers : —
(1) Undertaking on their part to have no diplomatic relations with
Turkey-Germany or Austria for a period of 15 years.
(2) On part of Entente Powers to guarantee to protect independence of
Arabs.
Further, a treaty of alliance with Entente Powers giving them freedom
of movement in Greater Arabia, and use of railways in Arabian area for
duration of war. Entente troops in Arab territories to be on same footing
as British troops in blunders. Entente troops to evacuate teiiitoiies on
cessation of hostilities. ^
Faruki insisted that this was dependent on Entente landing at a point
between Mersina and Alexandretta, and making good Amauus pass or
Oilician Gates. He further stipulated that Sheri! should not take action
until thi* had been done. I agree that any other course is out of the
question, and that to call on Sherd' or Arabs to take action until we had
made aforesaid passes secure would be impossible, kariiki also urged the
necessity of immediate and adequate action in Governor of Alexandretta,
addin " 1 that if Entente did not take this opportunity Germans would lore-
stall them, and once Turks or Germans got into Syria, Arabs would m their
own interests he obliged to reconsider situation, bor my own pait am
sure there can be no idea of Arabs merely troubling Turks in an advance on
the (Anal If we allow Turks into Syria Arabs will side with them m order
to obtain special consideration, Germans having already suggested the idea
of Turco-Arabia on the same lines as Austria-Hungary.
1 will >'ive observations on less important aspects in a further telegram.
Meanwhile, I am convinced of necessity of efficient action at earliest possible
moment to enable Arabs to move.
(3) 21st November.— Following for D.M.O. from Mark Sykes No. 20.
In continuation of my No. 19 on hypothesis that Faruki’s interview is
basis of our arrangement with Arabs, I submit
( 1 ) As regards France and Arabs, our task is to get Arabs to concede as
much as possible to the French, and to get our Haiffa outlet and I alestine
included in our sphere of enterprise in the form of a French concession to
us Thus we smooth the way for France with the Syrians and in a matter
where France has a traditional interest, deal directly with her.
Note. — Arabs will always welcome any extension of our sphere of
ente (-A r As'regards Arabia proper, I do not think proposed Arab movement
jtTprt our oosition in regard to our various Gulf and Red Sea interests.
Gulf iml Aden Treaties will hold good and I am confident that the suzerainty
of the Sherif in Arabia Proper will ... practice be purely honorary.
S. 290.