مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎١] (٨١٨/٢١)

not follow our advico, providod it ia not on a uuj iatie
wo make no attempt to foroe it down tneir throats. Briefly
we try to oarry out a policy based on the modern metnoaa oi
‘•indirect^ rather than the older ones of ■'direct’ r,ne.
3 # \ second reason for the good-will in question is that in
our negotiations with the tulere, over oil, air facilities and
what not, v# gire them a square deal* *e carry a money bag
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instead of a thick stick and ars prepared to talk instead of t o
threaten, this method costs some money, and takes time, but
in the ena we get what we want, and with no soreness left behind. 1
This does not imply that our policy is a weak one. In any really
serious differences of opinion between tue states and ourselves,
for example with regard to breaches of their treaties with us,
we are of course prepared to take a firm line, and a« you are
aware on various occasions I have suggested taking drastic
action, the threat, however, of this drastic action has hitherto
been sufficient to aonieve our purpose, and for the last ten
years or so we have been able to obtain our objects on the Arab
side, and to enforce the implementing of our Treaties, without
firing a gun or dropping a bomb.
The third and most important reason for tae good-will
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of the \rab states is tnat they regard His Majesty's Government
as their natural protector both within the four corners of our
Treaty obligations, and outside them. This in my opinion is tae
outstanding and permanent factor whlcn in all important issues
is at the back of the minds of the ft tilers and their people, and
its local importance cannot be over-estimated. The Arab states
have their differences with His Hajeety's Oovernnent, ami on
occasions X daresay they find us rathsr a nuisance, in connection
/ with