مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎٢‎٥] (٨١٨/٤٩)

almost inevitable and invariable reaction to any wiah expressed
by His Majesty 1 a loverrunent should be hostility liberally
flavoured with contempt.
4. Impressive as your arguments are, 1 venture to think
that a dightly different background can fairly be depicted*
1 e have achieved certain important results along the Trucial
"oast in the past century and there has been a v^st deal of
bargaining, discussion and negotiation. It is far from my
intention to belittle the patience and skill with which these
negotiations have been conducted, but let us be strictly fair
and remember, as the Coast remembers, how often we have had
to resort to "power politics 11 , how often a deal has been
clinched or an ax^gument ended by the appearance of a warship,
or a threat, expressed or Implied, of direct action.
intervals over the century the ships have fired their guns
and the echoes have sounded for years up and down the Trucial
and Batineh Coasts. In Bahrain itself we even assumed control
of the administration at one time (actually, if not by formal
declaration).
5* It seems to me there are two conclusions to be drawn
from these facts. First, that the Shaikhs have little respect
for eloquence or fair argument, but are quickly impressed bv
an exhibition of the power of the British Coveminent, of which
they need reminders froa. tin.e to time; and secondly that it
Is not unduly difficult in the*e parts to relinquish even a
system of close administrative control, as we have done in
Bahrain. But I must repeat here, to obviate misunderstanding,
that I do not advocate close administration. T have ar med
in my demi-official letter Ho* C/197 dated the 2:2nd Search 1938
that all we naed on the Coast is rore frequent patrolling by
the sloops (this of course includes dhow-searching, and
denotes/-