مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎٤‎٠] (٨١٨/٧٩)

that without it we got what we wanted.
(h) About three years ago the Air Ministry and tne
Foreign Office were inclined to think that with the actual
increase of our air t and the possible increase of our oil,
interests in the True ial Coast, not indeed a close administra
tion but some form of closer control might be necessary. The
India Office, the Government of India and myself took the view
that since we were obtaining our objecte by our present policy
of minimum commitments, it would be Oetter to defer unaertajting
new ones until the latter proved to be definitely unavoidable.
The matter was discussed at length at an Interdepar tiuci--a-*-
Meeting at the India Office held in about October 195o, at
which I was present. The final decision was to make no change
in our policy, but to ’•wait and see*. That this decision vas
correct is proved by the fact that our interests, new and old,
continued to be preserved by our old policy. Aircraft, civil
and Hoyal \ir iforce, continued to fly up and down the True ial
Coast and to use the local facilities in perfect safety, and
petroleum Concessions Limited geologists were able to carry
out their explorations along the coast.
(i) A further new *interest* has now arisen as follows.
Petroleum Concessions Limited as a result of their coastal
exploration came to the opinion that this belt of the Trueial
Coast was not oil-bearing, but that the hinterland might
possibly be so. They therefore wished to explore this area.
Owing to the lack of control of the coastal Shaikhs over
territories in the hinterland to which they laid claim, and to
their obstructive attitude, and to the equally obstructive
attitude of the hinterland 3haikha, it took us more than a year
7