مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎٤‎٣] (٨١٨/٨٥)

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oar« will have to be taken that we do not commit oureelveo too
deeply since the result of these experimental drillings nay well
be negative, in which case once more we shall have little
concern with the interior. On the other hand if the results
are positive and an oil field, or oil fields, on the Bahrain
scale, spring up in the interior, though even then we should
do our best to avoid all unnecessary commitments, we may hove
to adopt a policy of closer control. But this will then ce
unavoidable and will be undertaken for an object of Imperial
strategical importance which makes it well worth while.
( l ) I have said above that a close administration would
get us what we wanted straightaway instead of after long
negotiations. I very much doubt, however, if such an adminis
tration would act as a magic formula, a sort of ’open sesame',
for all our difficulties. Wo matter how close our administra
tion was, the territories in question would still belong to
the Shaikhs, and we would still have to allow them scope for
drivir^ hard bargains with us, or any oil Company involved.
(m) To sum up . There is only one test of a policy
and that is its success or failure. Judged by this test our
policy on the fractal Coast of non-intervention, however
hani-to-mouth and peculiar it may appear judged by the
standards of other and more regular administrations, emerges
with flying colours. For more than a century it has by and
large obtained for us our objects with the minimum of commit
ments, financial and political, and in recent years when net*
3ritish interests have been created it has still delivered
the goods. ?e have now a fresh interest on the Trucial
Coast: possible oil in the hinterland, and if this oil turns
from /