مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎١‎٥] (٨١٨/٢٢٩)

AIR VICE -MARSHAL COURTNEY pointed out that even if this
were so, the Sheikh had refused for years to agree to a
landing ground in Qatar although it had been strongly pressed
for.
Reverting to the incident at Debai in October 1934,
Air Vice-Marshal Courtney repeated that the Air Ministry were
unable to find that the pronouncements of the Government of
India covered the support which the Royal Air Force had affor
ded. The Air Ministry, he said, were of course at all times
ready to give this support, but he must point out that they
had not formally assumed any obligation to do so. The second
proclamation issued by Colonel Fowle on the 24th of October
had warned the inhabitants that !T 0 those responsible
will be held to account''« This was in the last
resort a threat of force and it implied that His Majesty's
Government were prepared to take action beyond any that was
now formally provided for. If, therefore, the policy
recommended by Colonel Fowle was to be approved, the /iir
Ministry must press, if only out of consideration for the
Air Officer Commanding in Iraq., that the Committee should
make a recommendation to clarify the policy of His Majesty's
Government in regard to such action.
MR. RENDER suggested that, if His Majesty's Government
v/ere to admit their ultimate responsibility for the affairs of
the Trucial Coast, such eventual action might be covered.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL COURTNEY and AIR VICE-MARSHAL BURNETT
referring to the fact that in certain possibilities the Air
Officer Commanding in Iraq might be called upon for assistance,
both insisted strongly that these possibilities were not by
any means remote. They v/ere, in fact, daily becoming more
urgent and when there were oil concessions to be protected the
Royal Air Force would need more facilities, such as landing
grounds, than were at present available. They could not,
therefore, agree to leave the matter in an uncertain state.