مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٦] (٨١٨/٢٥١)

ME. RENDEL explained that v/hat was proposed was not to
offer to recognise Tim Baud’s sovereignty over the Hurra
Dira as such, hut rather to make our latest information
regarding the Dira the basis of a new and generous offer.
SIR A. RYAN said that he had had in mind what he
understood to he on® of the reasons for Mr. Clauson’s
hesitation. If a large offer were now made to Ihn Saud,
he might think that he had got His Majesty's Government ’'on
the run" and wait for them to run still further. Sir A.
Ryan could not affirm that the offer now proposed would
bring about a settlement, as it would be based on
considerations connected with the Dira of the Murra tribe
only, whereas Ibn Baud’s statement of his desiderata
purported to rest on claims to sovereignty over the Murra,
part of the Manasir and two other less-known tribes.
Nevertheless, he thought that the proposed offer, even if it
did not lead to a settlement, would place His Majesty's
Government in a more advantageous position. They could
point out that they had given full consideration to Fuad
Bey Hamza's statement regarding what should be included in
the Dira of the Murra, the one tribe involved to which Ibn
Saud appeared to have a strong claim; and that, although
they had found it to be more extensive than the 37 supposed,
they were not deterred by that fact from making their
further information regarding it the basis of a new and
generous offer. Sir A. Ryan considered that, if Ibn
Saud retorted by pressing his other demands and a rupture
ensued, His Majestic's Government would be in a much better
position to throw the onus of the rupture on Ibn Saud by*
arguing that thei^ had made him a very handsome offer, far
in advance of any concession they had previously
contemplated, and that he had refused to accept anything