مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [ظ‎‎١‎٧‎٦] (٨١٨/٣٥٢)

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unlikely that we shall in due course have to adopt in Abu
j
Dhabi a policy similar to that which we have adopted in
Qatar* But there is everything to be said for holding our
concessions until the last moment* If we were now to ecive
the general guarantee suggested by the Air Ministry in their
letter of 26 th February, on •1365/35* to the rulers of
the Arab Sheikhdoms, that "as long as they conduct themselves
in a satisfactory manner H.M.G. would be prepared to support'
their authority", we should<^have^ so much the less to play
with if and when the time came for securing some specific
advantage, such as the grant of an oil concession, from
the rulers in question.
3* •© can, at the same time, entirely agree with the
Air Ministry that we must be prepared to bring strong
j pressure to bear to secure our desiderata if and when this
i recessary. A good example is the pressure which it is fun*.'
proposed to bring on the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi because of his
breach of the agreement intowhich he recently entered for the
j provision of air facilities. A somewhat similar case was
. that which recently arose over the removal from Tamb of
the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah's flag. The Dibai case, to
which reference is made on the papers below, is not entirely
parallel, but our intervention there has probably been of
value as emphasising to the local populations that H.M.G.
i are not prepared entirely to disinterest themselves in
mainland happenings.
Paragraph 3 of the Government of India’s telegram
is somewhat confused. If Ibn Saud were to attack the Truciajl
Sheikhs or Muscat it would in practice be almost impossible
for us to defend those States from his aggressions by land,
if by defence the Government of India mean defence by a
force, whether military, naval, or air, specifically
provided for the purpose. Any attack would be a breach of