ملف ٤٢/ ١٩٣١ "ادعاءات الإغارة في مناطق نجد-شرق الأردن" [و‎‎٣‎٥‎٢] (٩٣٠/٧٠٨)

19 ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية
to descend to any depths of servility to placate Ibn Saoud.
I am aware that this is strong language, but it is almost
verbatim the language used to me by Bedouins.
is o
There can be only two outcomes to a continuance of
the present state of affaihs:-
(A) As long as large numbers of the Howeitat remain
without the means of livelihood, while their cemels graze
peacefully a few miles beyond the frontier,and as long as they
possess no confidence that their own Government can or idli do
anything for them, so lon|t, :.hey will continue to attempt to
steal the means of subsistence. To reduce these thefts. His
Majesty 1 's Government will continue to expend large sums of
money, and relations with Ion Gaouu will continue to deteriorate<
By the present intensive anti-raiding precautions this 'Cmoving
can be largely reduced, but as soon as those precautions are
relaxed, petty raiding will once more increase.
(B) The second alternative is that the tribe will transfer
its allegiance to Ibn Saoud abjectly craving his protectioiio io
this Ibn Saoud will agree; lie will give them money, recover
their camels and set them up once more in the world, - m
conditio n - that they take an oath of allegiance to hin$ and
abjure the Amir Abdullah ana Els Majesty 5 s Government.
It is pathetic to consider now often cms samo
old game has been played by ibn bsoui, alv/^ys with So.
The case of the Diiaiir tribe xn Irao was x&ry sIltI lai
although they were never reduced quite so low as ilie
Howeitat arc now. Hie vnbe were ilrsi (as long ago as
1920 and 1922) as tacked by a series of cruouiug xa^do by
the Akhwan. To these (there was hhen no Leseri control
in Iraq) they replied as best they could by petty counter
raids