ملف ١٩٠٤/٢٧٦٤ الجزء ٣ "سكة حديد بغداد: مفاوضات عامة ١٩١٠-١٩١٢." [و‎‎٣‎١] (٥٤٤/٧٠)

MAii 19 i —
• \/'
N
1 2
■
KB
^[Ihis_pQcuiii6Ait• is tlis Property ci His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
n \
19 1
[A]
ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.
[February 7.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[5390J
No. 1.
Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received February 7.) %
(No. 103.)
Sir, Pera, February 2, 1912.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the despatch No. 20 of the
18th in stan t, in which you were so good as to forward to me copy of a letter from the
Board of Trade containing observations on some of the points raised in my despatch
No. 922 of the 13th December last on the question of the results to our interests of a
change of the trace of the Bagdad Railway between Mosul and Bagdad, bringing
Khanikin on to the trunk line. The application of the German company for this
alteration having been rejected by the Turkish Government these questions become
of rather academic interest, but I desire nevertheless to offer a few observations on the
Board’s letter.
The Board were of opinion that the suggested change would not be detrimental to
British interests because, among other reasons, if the Bagdad-Khanikin section were
built before the remainder of the line, British trade from the south would naturally be
benefited. This is, of course, perfectly true, but it does not state the whole case.
British trade would not be benefited any more than that of any other country—than
that of Germany, for instance, and German trade would have the additional advantage
of being carried by a German-managed railway, one of whose cardinal principles is to
further German interests in every possible manner. I am quite aware that German
transit trade to Persia is at present insignificant as compared with our own ; but we
have to look to the future, and to the probability that Germany, with its subsidised
line of steamers to the Persian Gulf and its railway in Turkey and interest in the
future railways system in Northern Persia, will at no distant date make a great effort
to capture the markets of those regions. The Germans, to use a homely phrase, play
a very close game, and we cannot afford to give away any points.
I regret that the Board of Trade should have been led to think that I am under a
misapprehension as to its views with regard to the possibility of discrimination, against
British goods on the German lines. My appreciation of their views has been chiefly
formed from their letter to your department of the 7th April last, from which I
gathered that they believed that such discrimination, at all events in the matter of
tariffs, could be fairly effectively guarded against by a written agreement, and I merely
meant in my despatch No. 922 above mentioned to convey that my knowledge of
German railway management m this country did not allow me to place an equal
amount of faith in the efficacy of such safeguards. The Board of Trade go on to say
that they fail to see how the risk of discrimination would be increased, so far as the
Bagdad-Khanikin route is concerned, if that route were served by a main line instead
of a branch line. This point is, I may observe, answered by anticipation by the
concluding sentences of the first paragraph of my despatch No. 922, where I drew
attention to the possibility of a direct line from Bagdad to Khanikin being built by the
contemplated international company which is to undertake the Gulf-Bagdad section, an
arrangement which would give us complete security for the transport of our merchandise
from the Gulf to the Persian frontier. It is obvious that if the Germans had succeeded
in obtaining the alteration of the trace this possibility would have disappeared.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.
[2375 g-1]