ملف ١٩٠٤/٢٧٦٤ الجزء ٣ "سكة حديد بغداد: مفاوضات عامة ١٩١٠-١٩١٢." [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٥] (٥٤٤/٥٠٠)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Goyemmegfc.]
BAGDAD RAILWAY.
SECRET.
[June 27.]
Section 3.
[22856] No. 1.
Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edicard Grey.—{Received June 27.)
(No. 389. Confidential.)
Sir, Therapia, June 17, 1910.
WITH reference to my despatch. No. 144 of the 8 th March last, I have the honour
to report that Mr. A. J. Barry called here two days ago in order to place the embassy
in possession of the latest information regarding the Homs-Bagdad Railway
negotiations. Mr. Barry had in his pocket a private note from the Foreign Office
informing him that the scheme had grounded on the opposition of the Germans ; and
his agent here, Mr. Maimon, had also gathered from the Turkish side that, though
ready to grant the concession, they could not do so in face of Germany’s objections.
Mr. Barry had therefore come to the conclusion that the Anglo-French group,
whose interests he and M. Tardieu represent, must set to work to overcome this
opposition and endeavour to arrive at a compromise with the German company.
M. Huguenin was sounded indirectly, and seemed not averse to coming to some
arrangement; his objections to the Bagdad-Homs scheme were that it would compete
with the Bagdad line, would take away from its traffic and business, and would
unfavourably affect its revenues; it was therefore disadvantageous to the Turks. It
must also be remembered that the Bagdad Railway Company in calculating their
kilometric guarantees on the line had taken an average of the general expenditure
over the whole line, irrespective of the fact that certain portions were far more costly
to construct than others. Thus, the portion which the Germans are busy working on
now, from Eregli to Adana, contained some 19 miles of tunnelling which was the most
difficult and expensive work on the whole line; they could not give up to England
the level stretch from the Gulf to Bagdad, and concede to France a rival line from
Bagdad to the Levant without requiring some compensation on their own account.
Some such compromise as the following might, however, be found acceptable: ■
Germany to continue their section on which she is now engaged, as far as. El Halib
or Deir ; the French group to build the portion between.Bagdad and.Deir with a line
of their own on to Homs, to join the Damascus Homs line (or possibly the Germans
to construct the Deir-Bagdad portion, and give the Anglo-French group running rights
over it to Bagdad) ; and the English to buy over the Bagdad-Gulf end from the
German company. .
M. Huguenin has meanwhile gone to Switzerland on leave, and it is expected that
he may go and meet M. Tardieu in Paris and discuss this project; he would endeavour
to obtain Mr. Gwynner’s assent, and if anything came of the negotiations the proposals
made would be submitted to the various Governments for approval. Mr. Barry has to
go to Russia on business now, but his group would be represented m any serious
negotiations that might take place at Paris by the E^rl of Ronaldshay.
If such a compromise as he proposes were come to, Mr. Barry would have the
Anglo-French part of the line run on the Indian or Chinese guaiantee system, which
he states works out at 4 | per cent, instead of 7^ per cent., which he makes out the
present German figure to be; from the Turkish point of view it would therefore, be
advantageous financially ; moreover, it would shorten the whole length of the proposed
line and the railway would be placed under the Turkish general supervision with
maintenance of Turkey’s sovereign rights. He was to have , seen the Minister of
Finance yesterdav and hear his views as to the proposals, which he understands are
favourable, but he has not informed me of the result of the interview. In any. case,
it was only of a purely tentative nature, as he cannot move m the matter without
consulting M. Tardieu.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.