مجموعة ١٠/١٧(٣) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٦] (٥١٣/٤٧١)

INDIA DIRECT^
‘-AliiBMPED COPY^
SPECIAL D'ISTRIBUTIOM iUlD WaR CABINET. 1 '-
441 4
1940
I
j
FROM IRA ■»
Be cypher. Sir B. Nev/ton, (Bagdad).
8 th July, 1940.
D. 11.45 p.m. 8 th July, 1940..
R. 7.55 a.m. 9th July, 1940.
No. 542©
nnnnnrmnn
CONFIDENTIAL.
Your telegram No.. 554 [sic] paragraph 4 and my telegram No.
296 and my telegram No.~334.
The policy and methods of Rashid Ali in openly playing for
safety in regard to Italy and war and in making himself a greater
champion of Syria and Palestine than any local inhabitants are
irritating and dangerous and have aggravated the ill effects which
recent course of the war was in any case bound to produce.
Nevertheless in the situation as described below I see no suitable
alternative to Rashid Ali for the time being and my provisional
conclusion is that it would be wiser not to try to force his
resignation unless he were to oppose coming of British troops or
for any other reason the situation became critical.
2. The chief political leader outside the cabinet is Jamil
Madfai, with whom I nad a long informal talk on June 26th. He told
me that when Italy declared war he had advised [?rupture] of re
lations. Since thoi, however, (as British adviser to Ministry of
the Interior agrees) doubts and fears of the government tea spread
[grp. undec.] public who would in consequence be genuinely upset
if the government after all that had been happening gave Italy what
would be regarded as an unnecessary slap in the face.. It would be
better, therefore, he considered, to await some new justification
for rupture such as safety of British troops, transit or_special
concessions in regard to Palestine and Syria.. Madfai said he had
remained outside the present government in order not to antagonise
influential army officers and he did not think any more represen
tative government could be formed in the present circumstances.
5. Some time ago General Nuri told me that if^it became
desirable under war condition to form a government of national
concentration with exceptional powers he believed that the only man
under whom all leaders could serve would be the Amir Zaid. On
July 6 th I elicited that when at Angora Nuri had advised the Amir to
return from Istanbul to Bagdad but ihe Amir had wanted more
explanations than could be given except at a personal meeting.
Nuri admitted also that the attitude of the Regent -towards the
idea of a Zaid government- was uncertain. Nuri is^however evidently
uneasy in regard to the political situation and said he might have to
resign/