مجموعة ٢٠/١٧(١) "المعاهدة الأنجلو-عراقية لسنة ١٩٣٠. مراجعة معاهدة ١٩٤٨" [ظ‎‎٦‎٥] (٣٠٤/١٣٠)

2
/4
• •
be possible for some time, the Prime Minister feels that
the position of Iraq and Transjordan, which alone have
British bases, will be very difficult owing to the •' ^
pressure of public opinion. He will certainly maintain
that Iraq, cannot wait until 1952 or indeed for anything
like as long, before demanding revision.
5. Your 2(b). The main difficulty is that what the
Prime Minister wants is something definite he can announce
to Parliament in December. The assurance that vr G will
negotiate at unspecified future date will not help him
much. I suggest that we should give him as much
ammunition as we can on minor points which we are ( *
prepared to concede by exchange of letters (e.g., air
baseguards (see His Royal Highness Vs letter of April 25th)).
(See your despatch No. 52). On the main point we could
harp on the Prime Minister’s own theme that the defence
of the Middle East Y^as matter for coordination between
Great Britain and the Arab League as a vtiole. (He vdll
probably argue that it is up to us to bring the Arab States
together, so we should be ready to give some assurance
that we were working to that end). How could Iraq suggest
revision of the main clauses of the treaty when the Egyptian
and Palestinian questions were still in the air? It would
give the Prime Minister useful ammunition if we could tell
him that British troops in Iraq would definitely be out of
the country by December 1st, I hope.every effort is being
made to accelerate their departure. If the Prime Minister
still insisted that, he must have something more for
Parliament, I think it would have most useful influence,
particularly on the Regent, if we could make some fairly
definite statement about the financial assistance for Iraqi
military expenditure, going beyond phraseology.used in the
letter attached to the sterling balance agreement, depending
on how the‘talks went. vr e might then find it necessary to
suggest sharing bases as soon as time was ripe for negotiation.
(Air Officer Commanding has been in communication with Air
Headquarters Middle East). A. O.C. sees no objection to sharing
Habbaniya and v/ould be prepared to hand over Shaiba completely
if we could move to Kowelt. Other points you make have already
been put to Iraqis in military talks. It might.be suggested
to the Prime Minister that he should make a statement to
Parliament to the effect that he had had most useful
preliminary discussions with His Majesty’s Government who, he
v?as glad to say, were prepared to go a long way to meeting
Iraqi desiderata. He could then quote our minor concessions.
The main point wa.s .complicated not only in itself, but forms
confused situation in the Middle East. Details vrould be
discussed by experts on both sides who‘would report to their
respective Governments.