مجموعة ٢٠/١٧(١) "المعاهدة الأنجلو-عراقية لسنة ١٩٣٠. مراجعة معاهدة ١٩٤٨" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٥] (٣٠٤/٢٦٩)

MMM
COPVO. ^
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Iraq).
April 10, 1933.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
| E 1853/105/93] No. 1.
Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 10.)
(No. 207.)
Sir, Bagdad. March 26, 1933.
WITH reference to my despatch No. 181 of the 22nd March, I have the
honour to enclose herewith a record of a conversation which I had three days ago
with Yasin Pasha A1 Hashimi, during which he sought to explain to me his
position in the new Cabinet and his attitude towards several of the principal
questions with which he and his colleagues will be called upon to deal.
2. I have the impression that, so far as he revealed his opinions to me, he
spoke honestly and frankly, and I feel that our talk has done much to clear the air.
Ilis views on the general provisions of the Treaty of 1930 are intelligent and
understandable and his doubts regarding the practical merits of the Railway
Corporation scheme are. I know, shared to some degree in many quarters under
no suspicion of Anglophobia.
3. Whatever may have been the words which he used in the debate on the
Speech from the Throne, I am disposed to believe that he told me the truth
about his intentions. He has criticised the treaty itself, and still more, the
extravagant terms in which Nuri Pasha s supporters have described it as the
charter of Iraq's independence, and now. while he is willing to make the most that
he can for Iraq out of the treaty, he will not publicly disavow the standpoint
which he took up in opposition, that it merely marks a stage on the road towards
his country’s emancipation from foreign control. Moreover, he distrusts the
King, and is suspicious of His Majesty’s motives for bringing him back to office.
Yasin has seen more than one man with a promising public career discredited and
ruined because he had left his friends and broken with his principles for the sake
of fickle Palace favour, and he has no intention of going the same way himself.
He must, therefore, maintain his reputation and hold together his political
supporters, so that, if necessary, he may safely withdraw from office to the Oppo
sition without loss of influence or prestige.
4. I had experience of Yasin Pasha as a member of the Cabinet in 1929-30,
when he was Minister of Finance in Naji Suwaidi’s Administration. On that
occasion he dominated the Cabinet and, by his insistence on making too drastic
reductions in the numbers of the British advisory staff, he was responsible for
Naji Suwaidi’s downfall. Shortly before my arrival in Bagdad he had, in the
opinion of my predecessor, goaded a former Prime Minister, Abdul Muhsin Beg,
into suicide, by urging him to adopt a programme framed on extreme Nationalist
lines. I am inclined to think, however, that two and a half years in opposition
have mellowed his views, and that he is not ungrateful to His Majesty’s Govern
ment for their successful sponsoring of Iraq’s candidature for membership of the
League of Nations in 1932. I believe that his main objection to the Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty of 1930 is to be found in the fact that it was negotiated by the King and
his intimate advisers. Nuri and Jafar Pasha and Rustum Haidar, without his
assistance. While I do not doubt that he will continue to dominate the Cabinet
and will obstinately stand out for what he feels to be Iraq’s rights, his spontaneous
avowal of his intention to consult me privately if things go wrong is a hopeful sign
that he has moderated his extremist views. The main difficulty that I foresee,
and this apprehension is shared by Yasin as well as by Nuri. is whether the new
Cabinet, which is composed of men of independent character and opposite views,
will be able to keep their peace with the King and avoid quarrelling among
themselves.
I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.
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