ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [و‎‎٨] (٤٩٠/٢٢)

3 04
Telegram P., 2' o. 72-D. S. ; dated the 2lst November 19i5.
Prom—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Delhi.
To—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” Basrah.
Persia. PollowiDg telegram from Secretary of State dated 19th instant
is repeated for your information :— Begins. Please refer to your telegrams of
hth ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية * are the above
contemplated.
measures
105
Telegram P., No. 472-F., dated the 21st (received 22nd) November 1915,
From —Ilis Britannic Majesty’s Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Delhi.
At present moment both Persian Government and Shah are genuinely
alarmed at situation to w hich their German intrigues have brought country
and they feel that Persia must adopt an attitude which is more definite neu
trality, even the benevolent neutrality they profess themselves ready to
practise, will always leave the door open to complaints from one party or other
and they woyld like to put end to all ambiguity and to declare that Persia
commits(herself)to one side or other definitely, Government and Shah prefer
to go to country)anif questions of alliance were raised I think that they
w T ould vote iovlen tente) Of course, for their alliance they w r ould demand more
than six points reported in my telegram No. 442 and first of all they will
require assurances of protection against Turkish aggression.
His Majesty’s Government aie of course much better able than myself
to gauge consequences to ourselves if Persia entered into war against us, but
I feel that they far outweigh any disadvantages, present (or^future, attendant
on conclusion of a Persian alliance.
If Persia willingly or otherwise joins Germany, German aims of immobiliz
ing force in India that are required elsewhere, of making insecure our
military position in Mesopotamia and of stirring trouble in Caucasus may
well be realized.
If Persia, on the other hand, becomes our ally German plans here fail
assuredly. In the event of Persia joining them they are promising Persia
that in two or three months a Turco-German army corps will be sent from
Constantinople. I do not suppose that they ever intend to do more than
send a small force as nucleus of an army for use against us in Mesopotamia
and Afghanistan, recruited, formed and organized under German and Turkish
officers. This scheme would be certainly abandoned if no response could be
expected in this country. Moreover, propaganda here would soon collapse
with Persian Government openly hostile to Germans; they would keep
certain number of small tribes with them, but all the greater ones would stand
by Persian Government. Prom military point of view our responsibilities
would therefore not be great. Persian demands as price of her alliance may
be grouped under two heads—financial and political. She will w^ant money in
some form but certainly nothing at all commensurate with cost of prolongation
of war for single w r eek.
As to political demands they may be comprised under six points above
mentioned or others might be added. Whatever they are they w T ill certainly
be aimed at freeing Persia from the hold two Powers have in various direc
tions over her. Apart from purely geographical conditions our hold has mainly
been established in recent past through Persia’s financial dependence on two
Powers and such is chaos reigning here it may be safely assumed that if all
Persia’s debt were extinguished to-morrow and large sum given to her to start
afresh with, her financial embarrassments will in very few years again reduce
her to depend on us so that to re-establish our present hold we shall again have
requisite lever in our hands.