ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [و‎‎١‎٦] (٤٩٠/٣٨)

n
It would seem certain mules were utilized to carry to Hamadanarms, etc.,
mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram and if this is so Govern
ment had already connived at this move.
German Minister has left his Legation and lives in house adjoining
f United States Legation.
To-day attitude of Minister was entirely unsatisfactory and (?) I think
troops should without delay move nearer to Tehran.
Sent to India, Petrograd, addressed to Foreign Office.
36
Telegram P., No. 34-D. S., dated the 11th November 1915.
p rom The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Delhi,
To—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.
Your telegram 145, November 3rd. All arrangements for disposition
of his force are being made by Officer Commanding, JNasratabad, in order to
circumvent any attempt by Germans to break through between Kain and
Neh.
37
Telegram P., No. 283-C , dated (and received) the 12th November 1915.
p r om His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Sistan and Kain,
To The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Delhi.
I have received the following telegram No 245, from Consul, Kerman
Begins. Jehind has Icollected Baluchis near Began with a view to Co-operat
ing with Germans going to Afghanistan. Could you not create a diversion
in the Sarhad ? Ends*
38
Telegram P., No. 284-C., dated the 11th (received 12th) November 1915.
From—His Britannic Majesty’s Consul for Sistan and Kain,
To The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Delhi.
(Addressed to Kerman.)
Please refer to your telegram 245 of the 8th November. I fail to under
stand the advantage of diversion suggested. The Germans it appears are making
for Afghanistan in two parties from Nain and Kerman respectively and I
suspect that they may have with them northern party and a wireless apparatus
brought from Baghdad via Ispahan.
They cannot with tribesmen alone make much impression against either
Kacha or Sistan and to weaken our line between Kain and Sistan would seem
to be play(ing) (the) German game. I have an idea that the most important
party of enemy will come through Naiband and the lesser party will make
for Neh. They will probably try to amalgamate eventually^ in which case the
northern party will I think pass south of Birjand. Our Sistan and Birjand
detachments have a most difficult task to intercept these two parties owing to
the fact that the Germans travel so fast and that it is almost, impossible to
get adequate notice of movement of the more northern parties. We rely
chiefly as regards lesser party upon news through you from Bavar and Khabis
but we have also got scouts at Deh Salm and are sending others to Khabis.
Until he is joined by some Germans with machine guns, Jehind cannot, I
think, help our enemies beyond wrecking telegraph line and office(s) at Dehaneh
Baghit and Bam.