ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [ظ‎‎٢‎٨] (٤٩٠/٦٣)

43
Repeated to Basrah and Petrograd.
and agents remain in Fars that any improvement can be expected in situation.
Tjnless Persian Government are prepared and able to have them removed, ln
mv opinion it is better for us to withdraw. I fear neither Kawam or Soulet
can be relied on to deal with situation adequately.
“ One advantage of withdrawal would be that it would enable our author
ities in Gulf and elsewhere to undertake such military and other measures as
may be considered advisable. Persian Government, I would suggest should
be informed of expulsion of British from Shiraz and that it entails on the part
of His Majesty’s Government following measures:
<£ A. Military occupation of Sistan and Arabistan Gulf ports.
“ B. • Stoppage until situation in Persia is satisfactory of all trade with
Southern Persia both import and export.
“Withdrawal from Kerman and Yezd might be also necessary. Addressed
Minister; repeated Resident, Bushire.” Ends.
jyr Of course if we can no longer look to Soulet and Kawam to save
situation in Pars I see nothing for it but to direct Consul and British Colony
to leave but though position of Consul is beyond question vcny perilous^ I can
hardlv think after his repeated expressions of completion (confidence ?) in them
that these individuals are really incapable of taking effective action piovided
we are ready to finance them and that they understand that we look to them to
administer province almost independently of central Government. Wb must
expect if Consul leaves to see both Kawam and Soulet fall into enemy s camp
and effect on Kuhgelus and even on Bakhtiari would be deplorable. Of
course I am most reluctant to ask Consul to remain in a position of so much
danger, but interests at stake make it necessary it appears to me to hold out as
long as possible. I think Kawam should be able to provide sufficient torce to
protect Consulate if we can find requisite money. Unless Indian military
authorities can find sufficient force to undertake expedition inland simultaneous
ly with contemplated reinforcement of Russian troops at Kasvin, I can see no
advantages in evacuation. Occupation of Gulf Ports would have little useful
effect and indeed would probably only result in adding fuel to hostility which
has been raised against us by Germans.
Repeated Petrograd and Sir P. Cox.
118
Telegram p ., No. 409 F., dated the 25th (received 26th) October 1915.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
Please see my telegram No. 397. Yesterday Prime Minister called on
Russian Minister and said that even with two instalments paid down 30,000
pounds a month was insufficient and that in virtue of retroactive effect of
moratorium Government required 8^ 0,000 tomans at once. Some of Turkish
officers (my telegram No. 402), His Highness also admitted, might be taken
into service of Persian Government.
Further I have received some evidence from Meshed which suggests that
Minister for Foreign Affairs who has hitherto shown himself friendly is also
playing into German hands by assisting escape to (in no ?) Tehran where there
are already some 80 of them of Austrian prisoners of war.
I have been unable to-day to see any Persian Minister. Monday is a
holiday. I hope however early to-morrow to see Prime Minister!