ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [و‎‎٥‎٥] (٤٩٠/١١٨)

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even so they had very partial success, for the Germans could always rely on the
gendarmerie wherever it existed, and, moreover, usually had the karguzar and other
local officials in their pay. The position of a local Governor was thus difficult. He
was, like everyone else, much impressed by the reports assiduously spread by the
Germans of crushing defeats to Russia, and he felt that to oppose the Germans was to
run counter to the artificially raised sentiments of the populace, and he hesitated to
risk an encounter without the most explicit orders from the Government.
By the beginning of August, however, a slight change for the better took place.
The appearance of the Cossacks in Kain and JSeistan, and the advance of our own
column from Baluchistan, and a little later the occupation of Bushire, woke Persia
up to the imminent danger into which party struggles bad led her, and it was then
possible (by the help of proper inducements) to get instructions sent through Suleiman
Khan, the ultra-Democratic Secretary-General of the Minister of Interior, to Seistan,
Kerman, and Ispahan, and occasionally warnings to Shiraz. Even so, these instructions
were often scarcely better than the traditional order “to maintain neutrality,” i.e., do
nothing, and when a more categorical message was sent it was not infrequently
cancelled by a subsequent secret telegram.
I do not, however, believe that this partial change of attitude was due to any fear
of future chastisement on the part of the two Powers. The impression created by the
Russian retreat in Poland was too deep, and it was rather from the consciousness that
German intrigues had been allowed to go too far, and from fear that unless checked at
once Persia would relapse into anarchy. The same apprehension forced even the
Democrats to recognise that a Government of some kind must be formed, and as they
recognised that a purely Democrat Ministry, even if accepted by the Medjliss, could
not stand for a week, they left Mustofi a free hand to get support where he could.
Mustofi-ul-Mamalek means well, and he is reputed, and I believe rightly, to be
absolutely clean-handed, but while he is aware of the dangerous position to which his
friends have brought the country, he is also appalled by the difficulty of surmounting
it. His proper course would be to assemble a reliable force composed of the Cossack
Brigade and Bakhtiari sowars to Tehran and then close the Medjliss and suppress the
pro-German press. But he hesitates to incur the wrath of his quondam friends the
Democrats by employing what are regarded as being respectively Russian and British
forces, and still more to be frank with the Russian Minister and myself and work
honestly with us in interests which are, as he admits, more Persian than foreign.
Instead of that he is trying to “ squeeze ” us in order to be able to conciliate the
Democrats and their kind by showing that he has wrung concessions from us. buch a
policy, which is entirely to the taste of so weak a character as Persia s present Prime
Minister, can only fail, and our present endeavour is to get what we can out ot the
Cabinet before it falls.
I nnvp tvf*
CHARLES M. MARLING.