ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [ظ‎‎٦‎٢] (٤٩٠/١٣٣)

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of instructions which we may receive and that I authorise him and Colony to
leave Ispahan if these instructions are not of a nature to relieve situation there
or even earlier if danger should demand this step.
Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to Petersburg, Basrah and India.
177
Telegram P., No. 321 F., dated (and received) the 7th September 1915.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Denari,
ment, Simla.
Clear the line. Urgent. Please refer to telegram from Government of
India No. 912 S., dated 6th September. My Russian colleague and I have
had in mind constantly the importance which Afghan and Indian consider
ations possess in relation to the Persian problem and the proposals we thought
out were framed entirely with a view to hold up situation in Persia. That
there is no small element of chance involved m proposal must be readily
admitted but bow policy of drift which Government of India advocates can
meet the difficulty I entirely fail to see. Every day the Germans are
strengthening their position here and by employing same methods as those
which they have resorted to at Ispahan, could even now render our position
impossible. The question therefore is not one of drifting but of how lom>' our
enemies will stay their hand and it is scarcely to be hoped that Germans will
wait for the occurrence of some signal success to alter position such as forcino 1
of Dardanelles. What would be much more to the purpose would be the
capture of Baghdad in my opinion.
An alternative course lies open to us, but it seems to me to labour under
same disadvantages as to the policy of drift which has been su^ested. That
course would be for us to inform Government of Persia that we are prepared
to give them support which they are always hinting at, viz., arms and
money or in other words to confess to surrender on our part and allow
ourselves to be blackmailed mercilessly.
We should ask Persian Government in return to close'the Mejlis, suppress
hostilities, newspapers, &c., and at first sign of such action on part of
Persian Government, Germans would strike their blow. That Persian Gov
ernment will go to considerable lengths to prevent the British and Russian
Legations from leaving Tehran is (as a) matter of fact only element of
present situation in our favour. Germans are endeavouring to overcome even
this reluctance and two inopportune incidents have just^taken place which
are calculated to assist German policy as they will give Germans further
ground for exciting Persian opinion. The first of these incidents is the landing
to-day at Enzeli of a Russian regiment, a force which is insufficient to
command respect but whose advent is provocative. The second incident is
the intentional deportation of Turkish Consul-General, Resht, but Russian
Mimster teUs me lie will use his efforts to get orders sent from Caucasus.
Indian Government consider our proposal involves playing game which
Germany wants; on the contrary we see game is already in hands of
Germans and we believe in the course which we suggest, by‘utilizing onlv
element of situation that is favourable and promising financial assistance
at same time and other inducements (ior?j pulling chestnuts out of the fire
which we have offered to Persia.
Chance of its being a success is but a small one, for I can scarcely believe
when moment comes so flabby Minister as Miustaufl would find courage put
bis name to a declaration of war against Germany, to say nothing of Turkey,
in spite of halt hints from Persian Government that they would at a price
become our allies. At the present moment disposition of Persian Government
awb* U Ai? ay be S ? U p d by fact that 1 have j ust received from Minister for
iorei n Attairs verbal message that Persian Government reject our proposal
insist on bn, S e r re < l u ® stlon ’ aud P ri o r to recall (of) Governor-General, b'ars,
insist on hoisting ot Persian flag at Buslnre.
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