ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٤] (٤٩٠/٢٥٧)

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I have made strong representations to the Governor-General and Pousette
regarding these and many other similar matters. Both profess inability to take
S” P enaan lntrigUeS “ the absence of P r °P er ‘^fractions
Addressed to Tehran; repeated to Basrah and Bushire.
Telegram P., dated the 8th (received 3th) June 1915.
From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.
xprflns
Eis Majesty’s Government accept Your Excellency’s views generally.
Telegram P., No. S. 554, elated the 10th June 1915.
From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Simla,
To—The Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S I. Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf, Basrah (repeated to His Majesty's Minister
Tehran).
Persian situation. Kindly refer to my telegram, dated Mav 19th
No. S. 500. j . j •
Secretary of State telegraphs as follows“ Please refer to your * *
Your Excellency’s views generally. ”
Telegram R., No. 1213 B,, dated the 9th (received 10th) June 1915.
From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Basrah,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
My telegram No. 1195 B. Following from His Majesty’s Representative
at Shiraz, No. 178;—
Begins. Please refer to Bushire telegram No. 215 C.
Your Excellency can perhaps judge by now whether there is any likeli
hood of Persia deliberately throwing in her lot with Germany and Turkey or
not. If such an eventuality seems at all likely, I venture to express agree
ment with Major Trevor’s view that the sooner the gendarmerie disappear
ithe better and that we should do nothing further to support them.
If, however, Persian participation in war is improbable or even uncertain,
I venture to dissent strongly from Bushire point of view which appears to
me rather to take into account interests of Bushire itself than those of Ears
.and those of Southern Persia, as a whole.
In spite of all their (insolvencies ?) and failings which I fully realise and
admit, it cannot be denied that gendarmerie have preserved Southern Persia
from anarchy during the last two years and have kept roads open for commerce,
posts and travellers. Such situation is, I venture to think, infinitely more
beneficial to our interests than a state of chaos which might compel us to
intervene and which might involve us in serious embarrassments of many
kinds.
During the last few days I have been bringing very strong pressure to
bear on Captain Pousette with regard to the question of neutrality, etc.
He is beyond question sincerely anxious to correct faults of the gendarmerie,
and has given me repeated and earnest assurances to this effect. (Above ?)
fact combined with my general observation of the situation and personal
experience convinces me that the proposal I have outlined is one best suited
to what I believe to be our interests, this is, maintenance of order in Southern
Persia and prevention of necessity for intervention here.