ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٨] (٤٩٠/٤٦٨)

(1) -to turn local feeling against enemy and
(2) avoid increasing existing anti-British feeling
in Persia.
As regards (1), Turkish incursion furnishes an admir
able object less-on. Its result was to re-awake latent
hostility of Persians against Turks and also to make much
talked of Jehad complete failure. Germans or rather Y/ass-
muss with his plan of attack on Bushire may render their
cause similar disservice: and proof is that German Minis
ter is now trying to induce YVassmuss to return to ieheran
just as Turkish Ambassador appealed to Raouf to withdraw
to Turkey. Presumably Bushire ought to be now able to
defend itself and I can think of nothing more helpful to
us than Yfessmuss's attack. In another direction we should
endeavour to dtilize press and I have just been enaoled to
make arrangements with that object by having had some funds
placed at my disposal by His Majesty's Government.
As regards (2) we should avoid any overt action
against Germans and (?operate provisionally) through
Persian Government. Present Cabinet has done something in
this direction and I have obtained despatch of strong in
structions to Governors of Kerman and Seistan to hold up
enemy emissaries and disarm their followers but it depends
on what support we can give them whether these instructions
will be carried out effectively. Like everything in Persia
this/question of money more than anything else. Germans
have well understood value of this weapon and I have every
reason to believe since I arrived here in middle of April
eneny missions here have been able to dispose of £50,000
at least, while German agents in provinces appear to be
proportionately well supplied. Until quite recently our
policy