ملف ١٩٢٨/٢٠٠ الجزء ٨ "المفاوضات الأنجلو-فارسية" [و‎‎٣‎٦‎١] (١٠٩٦/٧٢٨)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS B RITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
PERSIA.
■ jL-7
CONFIDENTIAL.
E 5244/208/34]
^ r 7
^ j ^ /
October 11, 1932.
Section 1.
No. 1.
Mr. Hoare to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 11 )
(No. 417.)
S 11 ’ ac r j u ^ • Gulhek, September 25, 1932.
AS 1 had the honour to report in my telegram No. 134 of the 20th September,
I received on that date a note from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Enclosure 1), stating that it was proposed that the new Persian navy should
use the anchorage of Hen.iam on its arrival in the Persian Gulf, and asking that,
as the necessary preparations had still to be completed, the British navv should
cease to use Hen jam as soon as possible.
fi vr • V' 1S TA ieSt WaS I10t ; llt0 ^ et]ier unexpected, in view of the attitude of
J °! C u° Urt r £P° rted 111 the fifth Paragraph of my telegram No 127
of the 8th September The note reached me, in fact, just after I had written to
is Highness asking for the further interview foreshadowed in that paragraph.
i i i a receiV1 ?^ bis answer, fixing a time for our meeting that afternoon,
I had drafted my reply to Ghaffari’s note (Enclosure 2), a summary of which
is also contained m my telegram No. 134, but had not despatched it. * I decided,
however that it could do no harm to let the note go without waiting to hear what
leymourtache had to say, and that it might even prove definitely useful in the
ntuie that it should have been despatched before the interview took place
4. An account of my interview with Teymourtache on the 20th September
of which [reported the outline m my telegram No. 135 of the 21st September, is
contained m a separate memorandum (Enclosure 3). At the time I regarded,
ms statement recorded m the opening paragraph, that the initiative in pressing
tor the immediate withdrawal of the British navy had been taken by the Ministry
ot \\ ar as an obvious euphemism. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has
smce told me that the note was doubtless sent with the Shah's approval, but from
wmat the I tan an Minister has also since told me, I think it possible that His
imperial Majesty’s action was not spontaneous. According to Count Viola, he .
nas tor some time past been pressing the Persian Government, on instructions /
riom his Government, to let him know what arrangements they had made for a I
shore depot, including accommodation for the Italian officers and men, who could |
e expected to live permanently at sea. After some delays and reminders he
ms recently received a note to the effect that “ when the ships arrived the Italian
o icers could look round and see what the most suitable place would be.” Count
mla conjured up visions of the officers scanning the horizon from the quarter-
eck tor a “suitable place,'' and told Ghaffari that for the sake of Persian
'imour-propre, if for no other reason, he ought not to ask that such a reply should
e passed on to the Italian Government, at the same time expressing the hope
mt some assurance more in consonance with the necessities of the situatidn would
f)e conveyed to him at an early date.
5. It is quite possible that under this pressure the Ministry of War, who
m\e presumably taken no steps to establish the intended naval base at Bushire,
roa} have decided that the simplest solution was to take over the British naval
^ ation at Henjam, regarding the extent of which they have, as admitted to me
.Y the Minister of Court, no knowledge, and probablv entertain the most
exaggerated ideas.
rp ^* T be general impression that I gathered from this interview was that I
eymourtache was much more optimistic as to the outcome of the treaty
negotiations than he had been a week previously, and even that his wish for a
tfement was stronger than it had been for some time past. I cannot offer any
mous explanation of this change of attitude, but his Highness, who is nothing
!i 11( ^ v °latile, was probably influenced in his mood by the present dispute between
Akn* 311 au ^bonties and the Soviet Trade Representation over the fulfilment
o the . ommercial Treaty of 1931. He was not. however, very optimistic about
e ° ll tcome of any conversations at Geneva, expressing the opinion that, however
[607 1-1] B