ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎٥‎٨] (٨٩٦/١١٣)

Serial No . 95.— From the Hon’ble Mr. F. W. Johnston, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.,
Agent to the G overnor General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan
No. 1078, dated Quetta, the 25th April 1924.
Subject i—Sarhad Affairs.
In continuation of my telegram* No. 1030, dated the 22 nd April 1924, I have
the honour to forward a copy of a letter No. 10 -Q., dated the 23rd April 1924 from
Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, Liaison Officer in Sarhad, regarding the line taken by
the boundary from the vicinity of Mirjawa to the Koh-i-Malik Siah.
2 . Since a Persian Governor arrived in Duzdap the question of the alignment
of this boundary has been occasionally raised in a not very serious wav by the
Governor chiefly in connection with the collectiont of assafoetida and the dues to
be taken thereon. Ihe matter was not however pressed in any serious manner
and I deprecated^ the raising by us at that stage of a question which the Persian
Government showed no sign of raising. With the advent however of the Persian
troops into Sarhad and the devolution of command on a man like Shuja-un-Nizam,
a professed militarist with little political foresight, the situation has materially
altered. The excellent condition^ of buildings at Kacha and the possibility of
extending his sphere of authority have apparently awakened his cupidity, and it is
possible that the present un-occupied state of these posts might lead him to take
the opportunity of occupying one or more. This state of affairs must continue
until orders are received on my proposals§ for a temporary increase to the Mekran
Levy Corps to enable this line to be garrisoned. I have accordingly already tele
graph ed|| to you suggesting that as part of the railway negotiations it should be
clearly put to the Persian Government through His Majesty’s Minister that unless
and until a formal demarcation is made by the two powders vesting in Persia the
ownership of the site of one or-any of the posts on the Saindak-Robat line, our
claim to all these posts must remain uncontested.
3. In paragraphs 2 to 6 of his letter Colonel Keyes has summarised the case of
this disputed boundary and I need not therefore repeat it. As regards the future
the question of any formal demarcation of boundary has not been decided and,
even if such demarcation be made, it cannot be said what course the line will take.
It might not how r ever be out of place to discuss the general question of policy. The
portion affected is the triangle bounded dh the North by the Afghan frontier, on
the East by a line running North North-West from the vicinity of Kundi and on
the South West by a production of the line Kolv-i-Malik Siah-Mirjawa with one
apex on the Persian border near Sohtigan, or very roughly the triangle formed by
the production in a Northern direction of the Persian frontier line that runs North
and South between Jalk and Ladgasht containing an area of some 3 to 4,000 square
miles. From the point of view of administration the possession of this triangle
brings with it certain obvious disadvantages. It is a narrow wedge placed between?
Afghanistan and Persia and its possession lays us open to responsibility in the case
of raids across it from the Helmand into Persia and vice versa, with consequent
international complications. I should doubt if any border defence we put on the
g- Saindik-Robat line, even at very heavy expense, could effectually guarantee
j immunity from such raids. It carries with it the duty of protecting the
railway from Kundi to Mirjawa which is vulnerable in the main from Persia
to whose co-operation we have at present to look for its defence while ourselves
retaining the responsibility. As regards the old trade route in the event of the
cessation of the railway, I doubt if this would be much affected by any change.
On leaving Robat the trade has in any case to enter Persian territory and trust
to Persian protection and I doubt if it would make much difference if that pro
tection were to be required further forward. The essential point would appear
to be one of Imperial Strategy. The possession of a frontier up to Koh-i-Malik
Siah gives us a point, some 150 miles nearer Sistan than Kundi, which we can
occupy at any time without question and without permission. On the value of
this aspect of the question I am however not qualified to speak.
*Serial No. 84.
tFile No. 869-M.
JNotes page 3, ibid. o • i tvt
§Dealt with in Frontier Branch but see also A. G. G.’s more recent telegram at Serial Ao. 91.
j [Serial No. 84.