ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎٨‎٣] (٨٩٦/١٦٣)

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petty chiefs of && L'ekran whose forts he was too weak
to attack, and accordingly collected a contingent
of Damanis* Their presence in his train was
sufficient to induce the chiefs to pay considerable
sums; but none of this would he give to the Damanis,
and the meagre loot they had succeeded in collecting
in that poverty-stricken district was not sufficient
for the trouble they had taken. Dost Muhammad
therefore proceeded to kill two birds with one stone
by egging on the Damanis to get their own payment
for services rendered to him in looting certain
tracts against the chiefs of which he had an account
to settle* The Damanis did their work pretty
thoroughly lifting some 35 ,wu sheep and 90 camels
and taking to Banipur one of Zargham-us-Sultanah 1 s
petty chiefs.
It was these incidents in which the Damanis had
done Dost Muhammad ! s work for him that led to the
reports on which were based the iion f ble the Agent
to the Governor General 1 s Do*3890 of 24th November
1923 (serial No.135) stating that the influence
of Dost Muhammad over the Damanis had recently
shown signs of notable increase, and his No.llo/L of
4th December anticipating that, on the Persian
occupation of the Sarhad, most of the Damanis would
retire out of reach, and that the Persian troubles
would begin when they smarted to make an a.^^emp u *^
recover stock looted from Jcruft.
7 , The factors which I had considerably under
estimated were the extraordinary improvement in the
moral of Persian troops of the Eastern mivision,
and. the very forceful personality of the ^alar
Am]ad.
The tribes of the Sarhad were slow to believe
that