ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [ظ‎‎١‎٤‎٧] (٨٩٦/٢٩٢)

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the occupation of Khwash and the inauguration of a loose Persian admi-
nistrauon m barhad stiould present no difficulties and meet with no
opposition. Indeed the number of troops allotted is far m excess of re
quirements for this operation alone. Our detachment can then be with
drawn well within the month, and I do not believe that a supporting column
will be necessary to cover its withdrawal.
9. If the importance of the Sarhad did not extend beyond its borders
the matter might remain there as far as we are concerneo, but this is fa?
from being the case. The Persian Government has, on our advice taken up
the question of the whole of Persian Baluchistan. At hrst programme B.
(Para. 3 of Serial No. 118) suggested by Seistan was adopted, and the
Slnuikat-ul-Muik was appointed Governor ot 1 ersian Baluchistan. Later
Kerman advices appear to have prevailed the Shaukat s appointment was
cancelled, and forerunners of the Kerman force are reported to have entered
the Province.
The Persian Government have expressed their intention of appointing
a Military Governor for Baluchistan, but no appointment has been made
and Dost Muhammad is being approached from both sides with the natural
consequence that he is trying to play off both candidates against each
10. I have only on mv return seen Kerman telegram No. 2 (Serial
No. 229) and Minister’s'' reply (Serial No. 232). 1 do not think that
Persian Government realizes the true state of affairs. Dost Muhammad
has put up a successful bluff and acquired a reputation far beyond his
capacities He has bullied or murdered one little man after another till
there is no one willing to oppose him openly; but he has not a single
in the country; and any (my?) latest advices are that he has now only 30
uniformed mercenaries whom he keeps as a guard against assassination, of
which he lives in terror. The bands he uses for oppressing other petty
chiefs are now hired for the occasion.
Should these chiefs and mercenaries realise that the Persians real! v
mean business and that we are prepared to give them moral support I do
not think that Dost Muhammad would be able to offer any resistance and
would admit the Governor to Fehruj fort. This would mean his speedy
11 The confused policy now being carried out as a result of differences
of opinion between Seistan and Kerman is, in my opinion, likely to play
into Dost Muhammad’s hands.
An ex-Governor of Bam, redolent of the old regime when Bampur
shook off the Kerman yoke, is going in from one side;, on the other the
‘Member for Baluchistan’, himself not above suspicion as an mstigatoi
of raids is acting as an honest broker between the Salar and Host
Muhammad. Such an acknowledgment of Dost Muhammad s strength
and their own weakness is only calculated to manifold the difficulties of
the Persian Government—certainly, at least, to delay and proba y o
vitiate the settlement.
12. I have already reported on the hostilities carried out by Qadir
Bakhsh from Kuhak fort, and suggested that the last incident might be
utilized as the thin end of the wedge for the restoration of Persian influence.
If we are to wait for the Persian negotiations on their present lines to mature
we cannot expect any satisfaction from Kuhak for a year, and it would there
fore be advisable to take action ourselves at once.
I had contemplated for this action to supplement the Makran Levy
Corns and my personal escort by asking for the, use of two 3 5 howitzers
which could be taken to Grawag (15 miles from Kuhak) by lorry and dragged
to Kuhak.
The fort is commanded by hills at close range. The garrison consists
of some 15 to 30 men and there would be every chance of obtaining an un
conditional surrender without firing a shot. The Salar was willing to send
100 camel sowars from Kundi to Grawag to take part in the demonstration
and to occupy the fort.