ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎١‎٦‎٤] (٨٩٦/٣٢٥)

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side. If ve do not do so we shall become responsible for a
► v winch lib.'' moro tiian possibly fail. The railway will
uc.' sufficiently ^u^rdeo oy such movement as the2/ make on
eastern side towards XK USE and our frontier can undoubtedly
^ look cuter it serf* As Persians are acting partly 011 our rep-
re s h 1 1 x0 j. i i 0 i s natu ral shat we sh0 uld g ive them
sympathetic assistance and friendly advise but as they have
rejected our offer cl military aid It appears to me if I may
be permitted to say bo that to become involved in what is
*
bound to be a campaign carried out with troops (with?)very
limited Graining, troops whose capacity to fight is still a
factor to be considered, would be an error. Both their and
oai i llu "'Ill^nce work is so very hazy at present as only to
be suitable for irregular warfare. On this I hope to submit a,
further report.
I may say however that I am suggesting that we should
present them with 1000 rifles from India which are useless
to us and with 2 machine guns now at this Consulate,
Tne governor General and GeneralOfficer Commanding both
con..,iaer °- attacking D M is a big one unless political
io unuertanen first for detaching from him as many
tribesmen as possible. They consider that when his people are
. uff xciently shaken will be moment to attack him if still
proves r*rc-..j.cxOranu. This work except as reg.ards SARHAD
tribesmen who might desert 3 ABHAD and -0 to his assistance
Cd,ii only be undertaken from Kerman and from south.
This opinion is undoubtedly common sense and more I study
trie general Question the more I am convinced to approach it
politically from Beistan has nothing recommend it nor have I
as yet heard of any reason for doing so while MILITAP 1 PY the
situation appears to be as stated.
Gill India kindly repeat to Baluchistan.