ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎٩] (٨٩٦/٣٣٦)

126
*
f f
| 1:
i
I
f 1
I
1
1
ii 1 ' J
1
r i
1
;.! i
1 \
y
.111
working concern, and their action in Persian Baluchistan is being taken
on this assumption. It may be argued that it is the duty of the Persian
Government to establish and maintain order in all its provinces without
regard to questions of railways; but the Secretary of State cannot but feel
that it would scarcely be fair to keep silence while the Persian Government
takes action in Baluchistan, and then to inform it that the Government of
India cannot afford longer to maintain its section of the line, which will
therefore be removed, thus depriving the Persian section of all value save
that of scrap material.
In the second place, though the Government India’s telegram (Serial
No. 154) refers only to loss on the Nushki-Mirjawa sections, it seems most
improbable that the Mirjawa-Duzdap section does not show a corresponding
loss, roughly proportionate to its shorter length. This is a probability
which the Persian Government, having regard to the customs revenue
collected at the terminus, is not likely to have envisaged.
In these circumstances, and as it appears to the Secretary of State for
India to have already become a political impossibility to remove the Persian
section for sale, except with the prior consent of the Persian Government,
I am to suggest that His Majesty’s Minister should without delay be
apprised of the position and authorized to disclose it frankly to the Persian
Prime Minister and the American Financial Adviser and to sound them
as to their attitude, in the light of the disclosed facts, towards the offer
formulated in paragraph 13 of the Government of India’s despatch* of
19th October 1922. It appears not impossible that the Persian Govern
ment might prefer to accept that offer, even though it involves some small
recurrent loss, rather than at once face the practical extinction of the
Duzdap Customs receipts; having accepted it, they would at any rate gain
the net sale value of the Persian section of line, if and when the operation
of the whole line ceases to be possible. But, with reference to sub-para
graphs (7 and 8 ) of paragraph (13) of the Government of India’s despatch,!
it would have to be made clear at the same time that the Government of
India cannot be expected to continue indefinitely to face an annual loss
of Rs. 4 lakhs on the line alone, simply in order to oblige Persia, if in the
meantime they are driven to the conclusion that, from their own point of
view, it would be preferable to take up the line. On the other hand the
Secretary of State feels strongly that every possibility should be examined
exhaustively before it is decided to abandon the line as unremunerative.
ri? 0 ^ S1 ? erS nc \ time sllould be lost in sounding such representatives
r ! tls b ca P lta l as have already evinced some interest in the line’s poten-
Uahties (for example Sir Hugh Barnes and other gentlemen connected
With the Imperial Bank of Persia and associated bodies). It is true that
tive^rmoon^hinn ^ f ^ ^ u . rc b ase or ^ ease of the line would be an unattrac-
Nu.MH ; b Y obvi 5 usl y a railway that ends prematurely as the
Nushki-Duzdap railway ends, m a desert, at least 120 miles from any recog
nised trade centre, is thereby shorn of possible attractions. 7 g
which^iVht^nL 1116 occ , asio f n for discussing the possible considerations
ght induce a syndicate to take over the line with a view to its
Such S extensten PO wh;!h WhlCh a P rofitable volume of trade would be tapped,
feucn extension, which pnma facie seems the only possible salvation for
., tl ,i„ e i&,, if sgyfcjteEisft*;
f 2^ N °' 84 iU ^ K °' 70 d) M - of 1923, Fos. 1-
-89.